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I. INTRODUCTION
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States
("Burlington Northern"), the U.S. Supreme Court, inter alia, held'
that under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"),2 the contamination of
the abandoned "Arvin" facility, a portion of which had been leased
from several railroads ("Railroads") by the principal owner-operator,
Brown & Bryant ("B&B"), was capable of divisibility
"apportionment" based on multiplying three factors: (a) time of
operation, (b) area owned or leased, and (c) volume and toxicity of
waste disposed.3 In this calculation, the product, which was rounded
up to give 6%, was further adjusted for uncertainty by a multiplier of
* William C. Tucker, A.B. cum laude Harvard College, J.D. Northeastern U.
School of Law, is an Assistant Regional Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Region II. He is writing here in his individual capacity and not as
government counsel. All opinions expressed herein, including but not limited to
positions on legal or policy issues, are entirely his own and are not to be construed
as those of EPA or the United States. Some of the opinions expressed in this article
were informed by conversations among the author and his EPA colleagues Walter
Mugdan and Delmar Karlen, whom the author wishes to acknowledge. The author
is particularly indebted to Mr. Mugdan for first raising the question of the district
court's faulty arithmetic in several public appearances in the spring, 2009. The
author also wishes to acknowledge the assistance of mathematical consultant Dr.
Carlos Jerome, Ph.D, and statistical consultant Dr. Janet Wittes, Ph.D., in the
preparation of this paper. "All is number" was a slogan of the ancient
Pythagoreans.
1. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870
(2009).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-07 (2010).
3. Burlington Northern, 129 S. Ct. at 1882.
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150% to make the Railroads' liability 9%.4 Since B&B was defunct,
liability was never apportioned to B&B.5 Although the District Court
for the Eastern District of California had previously held that the
site's "arranger," 6  Shell Oil Company ("Shell"), should be
apportioned 6% of liability based on waste disposal alone, that
holding was upheld by the Ninth Circuit but reversed by the Supreme
Court on appeal.7 At the same time, the Supreme Court explicitly
affirmed the existing standard for divisibility as set forth in Section
433A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement"), and
longstanding federal case law.8 However, in holding that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in apportioning liability as it did, the
Supreme Court lost an opportunity to correct the district court's
methodology under the Restatement standard in two respects: (1) the
district court's use of multiple theories of apportionment in
determining the extent of liability for a single harm, and (2) its use of
questionable assumptions in weighing the influence of those theories.
First, the district court broke down a single, but divisible, liability
(a harm capable of apportionment) into multiple components.' This
had never been found appropriate under the Chem-Dyne and
Restatement standard affirmed by the Supreme Court.10 In pre-
Burlington cases, apportionment of a single harm was only held
appropriate in a few instances.II Even then, this only occurred when
one theory of divisibility was alleged, because that increased both the
reliability of the underlying data and the likelihood of a proportional
4. Id.
5. See id. at 1876; see also United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., No. CV-F-92-5068 OWW, No. CV-F-96-6226 OWW, No. CV-F-96-6228
OWW, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23130 at *242-50 (E.D. Cal. July, 14,2003).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 107(a)(3) (2010); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (2010) (imposing
liability on "any person who ... arranged for disposal or treatment ... of hazardous
substances." Such persons are also termed "generators" in common CERCLA
terminology).
7. Burlington Northern, 129 S. Ct. at 1880.
8. Id. at 1880-1882.
9. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *259-61.
10. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 433A (1965).
11. See In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 894 (5th Cir. 1993); Coeur
d'Alene Tribe v. Asarco, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1120 (D. Idaho 2003); United
States v. Broderick Inv. Co., 862 F. Supp. 272, 276 (D. Colo. 1994); Hatco Corp. v.
W.R. Grace & Co., 836 F. Supp. 1049, 1087-88 (D.N.J. 1993); rev'd on other
grounds, 59 F.3d 400 (3d Cir. 1995).
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relationship between a defendant's contribution to the harm and the
harm itself.12 Where multiple theories (such as the three "factors"
invoked by the district court) are used, there is a greater chance that a
court will find itself simply weighing the equities to arrive at a fair
balance among the defendants; an exercise more properly associated
with contribution allocation than divisibility apportionment.
Second, the district court employed a flawed method of calculating
the Railroads' apportioned share of liability. The district court
multiplied fractions, or percentages, assigned to all three theories of
divisibility together to arrive at an apportioned share for the
Railroads. Since multiplication of fractions only yields incrementally
smaller fractions, this method may not account for all the harm, and
therefore may create a serious inequity by leaving the plaintiff with
an artificially-created unapportioned share. Even if the district court
had relied upon multiplying independent variables such as area by
time to arrive at an apportioned share for the Railroads,
multiplication of those factors would have been inappropriate under
the facts presented in Burlington Northern. Multiplication of area by
time is only reasonable where those variables are proportional to the
harm, which was not the case at the Arvin site.
This paper first outlines the pre-Burlington Northern divisibility
defense established over nearly three decades of federal litigation,
and analyzes the jurisprudence underlying both theoretical divisibility
and apportionment of a single harm under the Restatement. Next it
examines two questionable aspects of the district court's Burlington
Northern method of apportionment: the use of multiple theories, and
the multiplication of percentages to arrive at a final apportionment of
liability. Lastly, it suggests alternative methods to resolve the
differences among the three theories of apportionment.
II. PRE-BURLINGTON NORTHERN DIVISIBILITY
A.Background
In 1980 Congress passed CERCLA without any language
addressing joint and several liability, although liability under Section
107(a) of CERCLA was always strict. 13 As a result, federal courts
12. See infra pp. 36-47.
13. While liability under CERCLA was always strict, that is, no-fault, it was the
federal courts - with the tacit approval of Congress - which imposed joint and
2011] 3 13
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were forced to define the common-law parameters of CERCLA
liability, which they did in a series of cases setting the standard of
strict, joint, and several liability that still prevails.14 Specifically,
federal courts turned to the Restatement to flesh out CERCLA
liability based on common-law tort principles.' 5 In 1986, when
CERCLA was reviewed and amended by the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act (SARA), Congress again chose not to
mandate joint and several liability.16 Yet, during debate on the bill,
Representative Dingell said that nothing in the legislation was
intended to change the application of the uniform federal rule of joint
and several liability enunciated in the Chem-Dyne case."07
Due to clear Congressional approval of the Chem-Dyne scheme of
joint and several liability, rulings in nearly every circuit stem from
the Restatement;' 8  either through the direct adoption of the
Restatement formulation or through the adoption of one of the major
cases which themselves were based on the Restatement.19 Section
several strict liability based on the principles of the Restatement. See 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a) (2010); see also Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 894.
14. See Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 895 (stating that "[a]lthough joint and several
liability is commonly imposed in CERCLA cases, it is not mandatory in all such
cases. Instead, Congress intended that the federal courts determine the scope of
liability"); see also United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.
1993); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1992);
O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Monsanto
Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171-173 (4th Cir. 1988); Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 433A (1965).
16. U.S. v. Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 329 (6th Cir. 1998).
17. Id.; See 132 CONG. REc. 29,716, 29,737 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement
of Representative Dingell, explaining that "nothing in this legislation is intended to
change the application of the uniform Federal rule of joint and several liability
enunciated in the Chem-Dyne case" and that "the standard of potentially
responsible parties at Superfund sites is strict, joint and several, unless the
responsible parties can demonstrate that the harm is divisible," and statement of
Representative Glickman indicating that SARA follows the result in Chem-Dyne
and "traditional and evolving principles of common law").
18. See e.g., Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc. v. Bush, 292 F.3d 254 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2001); Alcan, 990 F.2d 711;
Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d 889; Alcan, 964 F.2d 252; United States v. Meyer, Inc., 889
F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989); O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 178; Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171-73;
United States v. Newmont USA Ltd., No. CV-05-020-JLQ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82922, at *141 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 7, 2008); Washington v. United States, 922 F.
Supp. 421 (W.D. Wash. 1996); Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802.
19. See, e.g., Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d 889; Alcan, 990 F.2d 711; Alcan, 964 F.2d
252; Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802. Note that, although a Third Restatement
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433A of the Restatement states: "(1) damages for harm are to be
apportioned among two or more causes where (a) there are distinct
harms, or (b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the
contribution of each cause to a single harm; (2) damages for any
other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more causes" 20
Section 433A of the Restatement has been adopted in some form by
every federal court that has addressed this issue, including the
Supreme Court in Burlington Northern, and imposes joint and several
liability in CERCLA cases unless a party is able to prove that: (1)
distinct harms exist at a site, or (2) a single harm is present but that it
is theoretically divisible. 2 1
If a party can prove that distinct harms exist at a site, liability for
the harm is apportioned according to each party's contribution.
Alternatively, if the party can prove that a single yet theoretically
divisible harm exists, the party must also prove a reasonable basis for
22
apportionment before liability will be apportioned. In Bell
Petroleum, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
described single, yet divisible, harms as "not so clearly. . . severable
into distinct parts, [yet] still capable of division upon a reasonable
and rational basis, and of fair apportionment among the causes
responsible .... "23 The burden of showing both a reasonable basis of
division and that the harm is capable of apportionment rests on the
party seeking to avoid joint and several liability.24
The main reason divisibility has been difficult to establish is that
when a party seeks to show distinct harms, or a harm capable of
division, the harm at issue is the damage caused to the environment.25
has since been issued, the federal courts continue to cite the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS as governing in the CERCLA context. For example, the First
Circuit, in a 1989 CERCLA case, stated explicitly that the rule adopted by the
majority of courts, and the one we adopt, is based on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS. See O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 178.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965) (emphasis added).
21. A third argument sometimes made is that a defendant's waste, even when
mixed with other wastes at the site, did not contribute to the harm at the site. See
Alcan, 964 F.2d at 268.
22. Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 895.
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 810.
25. See O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that where
wastes of varying (and unknown) degrees of toxicity and migratory potential
2011] 315
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Thus, in proving that the harm at a Superfund site is divisible, a
defendant must take into account a number of factors relating not just
to the contribution of a particular defendant to the harm, but also to
the effect of that defendant's waste on the environment, including the
"relative toxicity, migratory potential, degree of migration or
'synergistic capacities' of the hazardous substances at issue." 26 Even
if a party's waste stream can be separately accounted for, its effect on
the site and on other parties' wastes at the site must also be taken into
account.27 Thus, even where a given defendant can prove through
documentary or testimonial evidence the precise quantity and nature
of the waste it contributed to a Superfund site, it may have difficulty
establishing that the harm is capable of reasonable apportionment
unless that defendant can also show a clear correspondence between
that evidence and a resulting but divisible harm.
In general, prior to Burlington Northern, although the majority of
defendants raising divisibility defenses were unsuccessful, there were
three separate theories for apportioning a single harm that defendants
used in their defense: (1) the volume or quantity of waste disposed
("volumetric apportionment"); (2) the geographical location of waste
at a site ("geographic apportionment"); or (3) the temporal duration
of a defendant's association with a site.28
Volumetric apportionment has frequently been asserted as a
divisibility theory. Parties arguing volumetric apportionment often
attempt to prove that the quantity of waste each party contributed to
the site is measurable and commensurate to the amount of harm
caused.29 There are two general problems that defendants using this
method have encountered. First, they were typically unable to
commingle, it simply is impossible to determine the amount of environmental harm
caused by each party).
26. United States v. Agway, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 545, 548 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
27. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 172 (4th Cir. 1988)
(explaining that "[c]ommon sense counsels that a million gallons of certain
substances could be mixed together without significant consequences, whereas a
few pints of others improperly mixed could result in disastrous consequences.").
28. See infra pp 7-9.
29. See, e.g., In re Bell Petroleum Serv., Inc. , 3 F.3d 889, 904 (5th Cir. 1993)
(claim based on volume of disposal by series of plant owners of chromium from
same plant over time); Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Asarco, Inc., 280 F. Supp 2d 1094,
1120 (D. Idaho 2003) (deciding claim based on volume of mine tailings containing
similar levels of same contaminants).
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precisely quantify the volume of waste contributed, 30 and secondly,
they were usually unable to show a proportional correlation between
their waste volume and the amount of harm caused. 3 1 Due to these
problems, this type of divisibility defense has, more often than not,
been unsuccessful.32
Geographic apportionment is also a common basis of divisibility
claims. A party generally argues that if it were able to identify an area
of the site or facility where its waste was deposited and could show
30. See, e.g., O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 179 (holding unreliable transporter records
insufficient to establish reasonable basis for volumetric apportionment);
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1269,
1279 (E.D. Va. 1992) (finding battery count insufficient for volumetric
apportionment due to varying amounts of lead in the batteries).
31. See, e.g., Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d at 170-72 (holding that harm could not be
apportioned based on volume without information regarding chemical interaction);
United States v. Manzo, 279 F. Supp. 2d 558, 572 (D.N.J. 2003) (rejecting volume
of lead as apportionment theory based on insufficient evidence, including
"independent factors such as relative toxicity and migratory potential."); Agway,
Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d at 551-52 (finding no volumetric apportionment since
defendant offered no evidence concerning relative toxicity, migratory potential,
degree of migration and synergistic capacities of the hazardous substances); United
States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 966 F. Supp. 1491, 1504 (E.D. Ark. 1997) (rejecting
volumetric apportionment based on number of barrels because where "hazardous
substances are commingled, a defendant cannot rely on merely volumetric
evidence.").
32. See, e.g., O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 179 (holding markings on several hundred of
10,000 barrels and unreliable transporter records insufficient to establish reasonable
basis for volumetric apportionment); Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d at 170-72 (due to
commingling of waste, harm could not be apportioned based on volume without
information regarding the effects of the interaction of the various chemicals that
were spilled at the site); Manzo, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 573 (rejecting amount of lead
contamination from defendants' property as compared to total lead at the site for
purposes of volumetric apportionment theory based on insufficient evidence,
including "independent factors such as relative toxicity and migratory potential.");
Agway, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d at 551-52 (holding no reasonable basis for volumetric
apportionment based on wastes sent to site, since defendant offered no evidence
concerning effect of commingling of waste at the site, including relative toxicity,
migratory potential, degree of migration and synergistic capacities of the hazardous
substances.); Vertac Chem. Corp., 966 F. Supp. at 1504 (rejecting volumetric
apportionment claim based on production capacity or number of barrels because
where "hazardous substances are commingled, a defendant cannot rely on merely
volumetric evidence"); Chesapeake, 814 F. Supp. at 1279 (holding battery count
could not be used for volumetric apportionment due to numerous variables,
including that various types of batteries accepted at the site contained different
amounts of lead).
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that its waste only contributed to harm related to that area, then that
party should only be liable for those costs incurred in the cleanup of
that location. 33 Prior to Burlington Northern, these arguments
generally failed for two reasons: first, it is difficult to prove that
waste deposited on a specific area of a site was not moved or did not
migrate to another area;34 and second, because it is the harm that
must be apportioned and not the geographic parameters of the site
itself, if evidence of disposal is incomplete or inconclusive or a
defendant's liability is premised on factors other than disposal, the
harm may be regarded as not capable of division geographically. 35 A
33. See, e.g., Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., v. Bush, 292 F.3d 254, 261 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (considering claim that defendant's eighty drums were geographically
divisible); United States v. Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 318-320 (6th Cir. 1998)
(considering claim by Township of geographic apportionment based on disposal of
waste in discrete portion of landfill); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d
1265, 1280 (3d Cir. 1993), rev'd on other grounds United States v. E.I. Dupont de
Nemours and Co., 432 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2005) (considering geographic divisibility
claim based on proof that 10% of site area owned by defendant); Durham Mfg. Co.
v. Merriam Mfg. Co., 294 F. Supp. 2d 251, 267 (D. Conn. 2003) (considering
geographic divisibility claim by site owner-operator arguing its plume was distinct
from another plume emanating from neighboring facility); United States v.
Newmont USA Limited, No. CV-05-020-JLQ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82922, at
*141, 158 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 7, 2008) (considering claim that harm divisible based
on limited "footprint" of mining).
34. See, e.g., Brighton, 153 F.3d at 318-320 (disapproving Township's
geographic apportionment claim based on disposal of waste in discrete portion of
landfill, because defendant failed to show waste had not been moved at the site,
lack of information concerning disposal of waste by individual residents, and
evidence of maintenance performed by the Township on the whole of the landfill);
Durham Mfg., 294 F. Supp. 2d at 267 (rejecting geographic divisibility claim by
site owner-operator who argued its plume was severable from another plume
emanating from neighboring facility, because plumes commingled in groundwater
and harm was, therefore, not divisible); Washington v. United States, 922 F. Supp.
421, 430 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (rejecting geographic divisibility claim because waste
commingled and defendants argued harm was divisible based on distinct harms);
See also United States v. Broderick Inv. Co., 862 F. Supp. 272, 276 (D. Colo.
1994).
35. See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d at 1280 (finding that proof of 10% of
site ownership by defendant not sufficient by itself to establish divisible harm);
Chem-Nuclear Sys., 292 F.3d at 255 (rejecting claim that waste from 80 drums was
geographically divisible because defendant had not proven it was not liable for
additional waste at the site); Newmont, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *158 (rejecting
Newmont's claim that harm was divisible based on its limited "footprint" of mining
in the early "exploration" period of operation for failure of proof and, possibly, as
inconsistent with finding that Newmont was liable as an "operator");
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third possible theory, the temporal theory of divisibility based on
relative periods of ownership or operation, has rarely been asserted
and requires a very specific set of facts that are not often present at
CERCLA sites. 36
It is significant that, in the few pre-Burlington Northern cases
where the divisibility defense were successful, only one of the above
theories was relied upon in each case. For example, in Bell
Petroleum, where a series of plant owners discharged similar waste
containing the same single hazardous substance, chromium, over
varying periods of time, divisibility of a single harm was found based
on volumetric apportionment alone.37 Similarly, in Peck Iron & Metal
to Coeur D'Alene Tribe v. Asarco Inc., mining waste, including
tailings, were disposed of by a number of mining operations leaving
much of the Coeur D'Alene basin in Idaho contaminated with
cadmium, lead, and zinc. 38 Evidence showed that all tailings from
the area contained relatively similar levels of cadmium, zinc, and
lead, with differences from mine to mine being insignificant. Based
on these facts, the court found a "reasonable relationship" existed
between the volume of waste produced alone and the harm done at
the site.39 In United States v. Broderick Investment. Co.,40 the
defendant argued that the harm was divisible based on geographic
apportionment because the site consisted of two lots, each with its
own soil and groundwater contamination which had not become
commingled. There the court held the defendant jointly and severally
liable only for the harm done by the plume emanating from its own
lot.4 ' Finally, in a suit by W.R. Grace for recovery of response costs
incurred by Grace in cleaning up a site formerly owned by Hatco
Manzo, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 574 (holding ownership of a portion of the site by party
also liable as a transporter insufficient to establish harm capable of geographic
apportionment).
36. See Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 836 F. Supp. 1049, 1087-88 (D.N.J.
1993), rev'd on other grounds, 59 F. 3d 400 (3d Cir. 1995) (apportioning liability
based on time period of operation for portions of site used jointly by two
defendants).
37. 3 F.3d 889, 904 (5th Cir. 1993).
38. 280 F. Supp 2d 1094, 1120 (D. Idaho 2003); 814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va.
1992).
39. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.
40. 862 F. Supp. 272, 276 (D. Colo. 1994).
41. Id. at 277.
2011] 319
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Corporation,42 the court held each party liable for contamination on
those portions of the site exclusively used by one company or the
other, on the theory that they constituted distinct harms, but with
regard to those portions of the site used jointly, apportioned liability
primarily based on time period of operation.43
It is no accident that, where a single harm was held capable of
apportionment, these cases all involved only one persuasive theory of
divisibility.4 That is because to establish divisibility of a single
harm, a defendant must show both that the harm is theoretically
divisible and that it is capable of reasonable apportionment. To do
so, both the causes and the harm must be measurable in such a way
that the first is uniformly proportional to the second. In most
CERCLA factual scenarios where divisibility is colorable, there will
be only one way to do that. Although they are inexorably linked,
theoretical divisibility and apportionment are discussed separately
below.
B. Theoretical Divisibility
A finding of divisibility of a single harm (as opposed to "distinct"
or separate harms) 45 requires a threshold determination that, as a
42. 836 F. Supp. 1049, 1088 (D.N.J. 1993), rev'don other grounds, 59 F.3d 400
(3d Cir. 1995).
43. Id. at 1087-88. The court stated: "This method is satisfactory because it
directly links the manufacturing and waste disposal activities with the harm to the
environment." Id. However, note that in apportioning harm by time period of
operation, the court took into consideration "other factors" such as "the chemical
properties and migratory potential of the various substances at the site and natural
events such as surface water run-off due to precipitation and seasonal fluctuations
in the water table," including going so far as to calculate "overall percentages of
responsibility for each category of contaminant." Id. at 1088.
44. In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 904 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding
divisibility based on volumetric apportionment alone); Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 280 F.
Supp. at 1120 (finding divisibility based on volume of waste alone); BroderickInv.
Co., 862 F. Supp. at 276 (finding divisibility based on geographic apportionment
alone); Hatco Corp., 836 F. Supp. at 1088 (apportioning liability based on time
period of operation with regard to portions of site used jointly).
45. The difference between a harm that is "distinct" and a single harm capable
of apportionment is not always clear. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A
(1965) states that "(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more
causes where (a) there are distinct harms, or (b) there is a reasonable basis for
determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmts. b, c give the following as examples of "distinct"
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matter of law, the harm is theoretically divisible.46 But, in order to
show that a single harm is theoretically divisible, a defendant raising
the defense must first have a theory of divisibility that can provide a
reasonable basis for apportionment of the harm. Is the harm, for
example, capable of apportionment on the basis of volume of waste
contributed, area of contamination owned, or time period of
operation? To answer that question, a court adhering to the principles
of Chem-Dyne and the Restatement can be expected to be receptive
only to the one theory, if it exists, that provides a proportional
correspondence between cause and harm. Multiple theories indicate
harms: (1) two defendants wound the plaintiff simultaneously, one shooting him in
the arm, the other in the leg: each wound is a separate harm; (2) two defendants
operating the same plant at different times pollute a stream; each has caused a
separate harm, limited in time; (3) the plaintiff is hurt by one tortfeasor, then
treated by a negligent physician; the earlier tortfeasor is liable for the entire
damage, but the physician is only liable for the harm due to his own negligence; (4)
the plaintiff breaks one leg as a result of the negligence of one tortfeasor, and later
a second tortfeasor breaks the other: each broken leg is a separate harm; (5) the
plaintiff is struck by an automobile driven by one tortfeasor, fracturing his skull;
another driver then negligently runs over his leg, breaking it; the first is liable for
both fractures, the second only for the broken leg. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 433A cmts. b, c illus. 1, 2. In Broderick Inv. Co., the defendant had argued
that there were separate and distinct geographic areas of contamination. Although
the court did not specifically find that the harm was divisible into separate harms, it
appears to have concluded that the two contaminant plumes did in fact constitute
distinct harms. See Broderick Inv. Co., 862 F. Supp. at 277. But note that in Bell
Petroleum, which presented a fact scenario similar to the Restatement's example,
above, of distinct harms consisting of a stream polluted by two successive owners
of the same plant, the court found the polluted stream and aquifer presented a
singular harm divisible based on volumetric apportionment. Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d
at 909 (Parker, J., dissenting) (". . . the majority is correct that the single chromium
harm ... is the sort theoretically capable of apportionment") (emphasis added).
46. See United States v. Burlington Northern, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1881; Bell
Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 896; United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802,
811 (S.D. Ohio 1983); see also Bruce S. Gelber, Alive and Well: CERCLA Liability
After Burlington Northern, SUPERFUND AND NAT. RESOURCE DAMAGES LITIG.
COMM. NEWSL, (American Bar Association) March 2010, at 6 ("To succeed in
apportioning liability for a single harm, a defendant must show both that (1) the
harm is theoretically capable of apportionment, and that (2) there is sufficient
evidence in the record to allow a court to apportion liability for such harm and the
resulting costs.") (citing United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 718 (8th Cir.
2001)).
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uncertainty, where the connection between cause and harm can
become increasingly attenuated through complicating factors.47
Initially, it is important to recognize that, as a matter of law, most
harms are neither separable into distinct harms nor, if singular,
48
capable of apportionment. Examples given in the Restatement of
single harms that are not capable of apportionment are death, a
broken leg, a single wound, destruction of a house by fire, or the
sinking of a barge.49 "By far the greater number of personal injuries,
and of harms to tangible property," the Restatement continues, "are
thus normally single and indivisible."50 In such cases, "if the
defendant is liable at all, he is liable for the entire indivisible harm
which he has caused." 5
However, the Restatement states that there are certain harms that
"while not so clearly marked out as severable into distinct parts, are
still capable of division upon a reasonable and rational basis, and of
fair apportionment among the causes responsible."5 2 Examples of
such singular harms capable of apportionment given by the
Restatement are: (1) destruction of a farmer's crop by cattle-
divisible among the owners of the cattle on the basis of the number
47. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 170-72 (4th Cir.
1988) (finding that due to commingling, no apportionment based on volume
without information regarding the effects of the interaction of the various chemicals
disposed); Durham Mfg. Co. v. Merriam Mfg. Co., 294 F. Supp. 2d 251, 267 (D.
Conn. 2003) (rejecting geographic divisibility claim based on commingling of
groundwater contaminant plumes); United States v. Manzo, 279 F. Supp. 2d 558,
573 (D.N.J. 2003) (rejecting volumetric apportionment based on insufficient
evidence, including "independent factors such as relative toxicity and migratory
potential."); United States v. Agway Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 545, 551-52 (N.D.N.Y.
2002) (finding no basis for volumetric apportionment since no evidence as to
relative toxicity, migratory potential, degree of migration and synergistic capacities
of the hazardous substances); Washington v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 421, 430
(W.D. Wash. 1996) (rejecting geographic divisibility claim because waste was
commingled); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F.
Supp. 1269, 1279 (E.D. Va. 1992) (holding battery count insufficient for
volumetric apportionment due to numerous variables).
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A , cmt. 1, § 2 (1965)
("Certain kinds of harm, by their very nature, are normally incapable of any logical,
reasonable, or practical division ... .By far the greater number of personal injuries,
and of harms to tangible property, are ... normally single and indivisible.").
49. Id.
50. Id.
5 1. Id.
52. Id. at cmt. d § 1.
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owned by each, because of "the reasonable assumption that the
respective harm done is proportionate to that number;" 53 (2) pollution
of a stream by two or more factories-apportioned among the owners
of the factories on the basis of the respective quantities discharged by
each, because "the interference with the plaintiffs use of the water
may be treated as divisible in terms of degree;" 54 (3) ten sheep killed
by five dogs-divisible on the basis of ownership of a certain number
of dogs by each defendant; (4) flooding of a farmer's land from an
irrigation ditch-divisible on the basis of the volume of water
contributed by each tortfeasor; and (5) the pollution of a downstream
riparian owner's water by oil-divisible on the basis of the
percentage of oil contributed by each polluter. 5 In all these
examples, a direct connection between a harm and its causes depends
upon one theory of divisibility alone, and on the proportionality of
the causes to the harm: that is, similarity among the causes and
homogeneity of the harm.
For instance, in the first example above, the harm is deemed
divisible on the basis of the number of errant cows alone. 56 This
assumes that each cow caused the same amount of damage; that is,
there is a direct correlation between the number of cows and the harm
done to the field. But what if the harm had not been caused just by
cattle, but by a whole menagerie? Say barn doors are left open by the
farmer's neighbors and sheep, cows, dogs, horses, pigs, chickens,
cats, and cows wander into his field; each of which has its own
unique way of inflicting harm upon his crop to varying degrees. The
harm is still a trampled crop, although it may or may not remain
uniform, but would the number of animals by itself still provide a
reasonable measure of that harm? It seems unlikely.
Similarly, the second example above assumes that the "pollution"
all be of the same kind. Why? Because the Restatement reasons that
5 3. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 433A, subsection 1, cmt. d,
illus. 3, 4, 5 (1965).
56. Id. at cmt. d ("[W]here the cattle of two or more owners trespass upon the
plaintiffs land and destroy his crop, the aggregate harm is a lost crop, but it may
nevertheless be apportioned among the owners of the cattle, on the basis of the
number owned by each, and the reasonable assumption that the respective harm
done is proportionate to that number.")
2011] 323
324 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
the harm caused by the pollution is "divisible in terms of degree."5 7
But when one speaks of degrees or quantities of pollution, without
more, one is not distinguishing between types of pollution: the
assumption of the Restatement's drafters must have been that only
one kind of pollution was involved, where quantity alone would
provide a reasonable correlation between the actions of the
defendants and the harm.58 Should one tortfeasor have contributed,
say, PCBs, while the other discharged heated, non-contact cooling
water (also a "pollutant"), it is clear that volume of pollution alone
would not necessarily correspond to the harm caused by each
tortfeasor. 59 Thus, it appears that for a defense of divisibility to be
successful, the causes of the harm must all be similar and therefore
quantifiable, capable of being reduced to a number or percentage by
which the harm, which itself must also be uniform, can be measured.
The Restatement's Illustrations under Comment (d) further
demonstrate that divisibility of a single harm is only appropriate
when there is sufficient proportionality of cause to harm to conclude
that the only significant variable is one of "degree." In Illustration
three (example three above), basing divisibility on the number of
dogs owned by each defendant requires "that all of the dogs are of the
same general size and ferocity."60 But what if the dogs were of the
same number and ownership but of varying breeds and temperament?
Shouldn't such evidence also be taken into account? Perhaps yes, but
would the number of dogs owned by each tortfeasor alone still
provide a basis for divisibility? Probably not. In Illustrations four
and five (examples four and five above) the harm is caused by water
57. Id. ("[W]here two or more factories independently pollute a stream, the
interference with the plaintiff's use of the water may be treated as divisible in terms
of degree, and may be apportioned among the owners of the factories, on the basis
of evidence of the respective quantities of pollution discharged into the stream.")
58. For example, the notes to section 433A of the Restatement indicate that this
hypothetical is based in part on a case in which three oil companies independently
caused pollution of a creek used by rice farmers for irrigation. The "pollutant"
consisted of "salt water," no distinction being made by the court among the kinds
of pollution contributed by each company. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Hardee,
189 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1951). The releases originated from "salt water
disposal systems" maintained by the companies, although the plaintiffs alleged the
salt water contained "other contaminating and injurious substances." Id. at 207-08.
59. See 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (2010) (describing Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)
as listed hazardous substances); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2010) (listing "heat" as a
pollutant).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 433A, subsection 1, cmt. d, illus. 3.
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in the first instance, and by "oil" in the second. Since in both
examples the type of harm caused by all tortfeasors was the same
(water in the first case, oil in the second), the volume contributed by
each provided a reasonable basis for apportionment. However, let's
assume a third scenario, where one tortfeasor discharges water and
the other oil, so that the resulting harm is caused by neither water nor
oil but by an emulsion. Would volume alone still provide a
"reasonable basis of apportionment" making the singular harm
(pollution by oil and water) divisible? Probably not, since the harm,
even if uniformly distributed, could no longer be apportioned based
simply on the amount of oil or water released. This should
demonstrate the difficulty of making theoretical divisibility
determinations in CERCLA cases (which are usually much more
complex than the Restatement's illustrations) involving multiple
contaminants of varying toxicity, interactive potential, and migratory
capability.
The district court in Burlington Northern glossed over the
threshold question of theoretical divisibility; concluding only that "a
'single harm' may be divisible because it is possible to discern the
degree to which different parties contributed to the damage."6'
Although the court of appeals directly addressed this question, 6 2 it
merely concluded that "[t]here is no dispute here on the first, purely
legal question-whether the harm is capable of apportionment." 63
The Supreme Court merely adopted this finding, noting only that
"both the [d]istrict [c]ourt and the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals agreed that the
harm... although singular, was theoretically capable of
apportionment." 64
However, one might wish that the Supreme Court had examined
this question more closely. As should be apparent from the
61. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *238.
62. United States v. Burlington Northern Co., 502 F.3d 781, 801 (9th Cir. 2007)
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted) ("We inquire, first, whether the particular
harm at issue in the case is theoretically capable of apportionment . . . That
question is one of law, reviewed de novo. Second, we review for clear error
whether the defendant submitted evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable basis
for the apportionment of liability . . . ."). Note that the court of appeals further
clarified that the harm (the contamination and/or its cleanup costs) was
"conceptually" allocable, but only "with perfect information," which the court
ultimately found lacking.
63. Id.
64. Burlington Northern v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1881 (2009).
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Restatement's examples, not all harms are theoretically capable of
apportionment just because, as the district court stated, "it is possible
to discern the degree to which different parties contributed to the
damage." 65  Those circumstances where apportionment is
appropriate, according to the Restatement, are more limited:
apportionment is only appropriate when both the causes and the harm
can all be accounted for and bear a proportional relationship to one
another. In such cases, to prove a reasonable basis for apportionment,
no "heroic labor" is required-the facts themselves would seem to
demand such treatment. 66 Conversely, where conditions appropriate
for apportionment are not present, no amount of effort would appear
sufficient to the task. This would be like attempting to hammer a
square peg into a round hole, unless that effort was really equitable
allocation masquerading as divisibility apportionment. Since
theoretical divisibility is a question of law, one hopes that greater
attention would be paid to this threshold matter by courts in future
"divisibility" cases. As one writer states:
... according to both the Second Restatement and the
Supreme Court, the apportionment inquiry is a two-step
process. If Burlington Northern is understood to imply that
courts have misunderstood the nature of the second step,
that understanding warrants re-examination of the first step.
The requirement that a harm be 'theoretically capable of
apportionment' must have some substantive content, or
neither the Second Restatement nor the Supreme Court
would have bothered articulating it.67
65. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 2003 U.S. Dist, LEXIS at *238.
66. See Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct.
1870, 1885-86 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the district court's sua
sponte "equitable apportionment analysis" as "an heroic labor," since neither the
Railroads nor Shell had, in the words of the district court, "offered helpful
arguments to apportion liability." That is, the issue had not been developed or
argued before the district court. For that reason, Justice Ginsburg would have
remanded the case to the district court to "give all parties a fair opportunity to
address that court's endeavor to allocate costs.").
67. Steve C. Gold, Dis-Jointed? Several Approaches to Divisibility after
Burlington Northern, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 307, 334 (2009).
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C. Apportionment
To establish divisibility, a defendant asserting the defense must
prove that a singular harm is reasonably capable of apportionment. 68
A defendant must show a correspondence between the causes that
give rise to liability, 69 which are capable of division, and the harm,
which is not (unless the harm is divisible into distinct harms, it is
only capable of apportionment). This relationship can be illustrated
as follows. Where C, represents the causes of a defendant asserting
the defense, C represents all other actions or causes, and H
represents a single harm (whether regarded as the contamination
itself or EPA's costs of cleaning it up),70 the harm is theoretically
divisible by applying a percentage corresponding to the following
fraction:
In that case, a single but theoretically divisible harm, H, capable of
reasonable apportionment into H and Hb, could be depicted as in
Figure 1 below, where x and n are expressed in units of causation
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965) ("Damages for harm
are to be apportioned among two or more causes where (a) there are distinct harms,
or (b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a
single harm.").
69. It should be emphasized that proof of "causation" (in the traditional tort
sense) is not required in CERCLA cases, where liability is statutory and strict, if
not always joint and several. See In re Bell Petroleum Servs,, Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 893
(5th Cir. 1998); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 670 n. 8 (5th Cir.
1989) ("[I]n cases involving multiple sources of contamination, a plaintiff need not
prove a specific causal link between costs incurred and an individual generator's
waste."); See also United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721 (2d
Cir. 1993); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 266 (3d Cir.
1992). A better term might be "nexus," that is, a connection between the defendant
and the site which, if proved, establishes the elements of proof required for strict
liability. See, e.g., United States v. Burlington Northern Co., 502 F.3d 781, 796-97
(9th Cir. 2007) (discussing "causation" in its ill-fated opinion). For simplicity, the
term "cause" is used here to mean those actions by a party (or, in the case of a site
"owner," its legal status), which make it liable under section 107(a) of CERCLA,
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2010).
70. See infra n. 78.
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(such as numbers of barrels, or acres owned), a and b in units of
apportioned harm (such as acres of a lost crop, or damages
proportional to the harm), and the ratio x : n = a : b.
Figure 1
x n
a b
This figure illustrates several key points regarding apportionment.
First, in order to apportion a single harm, both the causes and the
harm must be capable of measurement.7 1 As demonstrated by the
Restatement's examples, measurement requires both quantitative
consistency in the measure used and qualitative uniformity in the
thing being measured: the causes, collectively, and the harm must
each be capable of representation by common units of measure of
uniform significance. This is essential in order to ensure
proportionality of cause to harm.
For example, in measuring sugar, one cannot use incompatible
measures. So many pounds of sugar cannot be added to so many
liters of sugar to get a meaningful total-all the units of measure
must be of the same type. Similarly, the medium measured must be
of uniform quality. It cannot consist of sugar in varying forms
(cubes, powder, granules) or contain impurities which are unknown
or unevenly distributed. Each unit of measurement must have equal
"weight" or significance. The environmental impact of a gallon of
water cannot reasonably be compared to that of a gallon of crude oil.
Therefore, to provide a reasonable means of apportionment, each unit
of measure (with regard to the causes) must reflect similar actions by
71. The two measures need not necessarily be the same. In the figure above, for
example, the defendant's actions (x) correspond to portion of the total harm (a); but
x may be one unit of measure, say cows, whereas a may be another, say acres of a
field trampled by cows.
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all defendants, and (with regard to the resulting damage) the same
type and degree of harm.
This is apparent if we return to the Restatement's examples. In
example one above, the harm, a despoiled field or a portion of one, is
presumably capable of measurement by acres or say, numbers of ears
of corn lost. Either way, it is capable of apportionment by units of
measure that will consistently reflect both the degree and type of
harm caused. Similarly, the number of cows alone is assumed to
provide a consistent measure of the causes contributing to the harm.
Each cow is considered to have caused the same amount and type of
harm. In example two, the type of "pollution" is presumed to be all
of the same kind, and therefore the causes can be reasonably divided
according to the volume of "pollution" contributed by each factory
alone. The harm, interference with the plaintiffs "use" of the water
polluted, may be measured by the quantity of water lost or by a
damages figure proportional to it. In example three (the
Restatement's Illustration 3), the number of dogs alone provides a
consistent measure since all the dogs are presumed to have
contributed equally to the harm. Similarly, the harm may be
measured by the number of dead sheep without any distinction of
quality or value being made among the sheep. Finally, in examples
four and five (Illustrations four and five), the quantity of water or oil
released alone is considered a reasonable measure on which to base
apportionment because the oil and water are each presumed uniform
in composition and destructiveness.
Second, Figure 1 shows that in apportioning a divisible harm, all
the harm must be accounted for. Apportionment cannot leave a
phantom unapportioned share for the innocent plaintiff to absorb
(thus, C, + C,, in the figure above must account for all the harm, II).
As the Supreme Court stated in Burlington Northern: "[u]nder the
Restatement, when two or more persons acting independently caus[e]
a distinct or single harm for which there is a reasonable basis for
division according to the contribution of each, each is subject to
liability only for the portion of the total harm that he has himself
caused." 72 Therefore, in order for a harm to be divisible, 100% of the
72. Burlington Northern v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1881 (2009).
(emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A, 881 (1965);
also citing William M. Prosser, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, pp. 313-314
(St. Paul, West Pub. Co. 4th ed. 1971).
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harm must be ascribed to its various causes. 73 Under the
Restatement's Section 433A, where apportionment is appropriate,
one defendant should not be held jointly and severally liable for
separate harms or that portion of a single but divisible harm which is
attributable to another tortfeasor or cause. In other words, a harm is
divisible when there is a reasonable basis for determining the
contribution of each cause to a single harm. 74 The Restatement
provides that "[t]he rules stated in this Section apply whenever two or
more causes have combined to bring about harm to the plaintiff, and
each has been a substantial factor in producing the harm."75 The court
in Saporito cited § 433A(1)(b) when it confirmed that "when there is
a single harm, apportionment is appropriate only if there are multiple
causes."76
A corollary to the aforementioned would be that no one party can
be theoretically liable for all of a singular harm (that is, 100% liable)
because that would render the harm incapable of apportionment.
Under § 433A(1)(b), there must be "a reasonable basis for
determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm"-
otherwise the harm is not capable of apportionment.77 § 433A's
Comment i, subsection (2), states: "harms which are normally
incapable of any logical, reasonable, or practical division include
where either cause would have been sufficient in itself to bring about
the result."7 8 This concept may not apply, however, in the case of
distinct harms. For example, the Restatement contains an Illustration
of two distinct harms where a plaintiff is struck by one car which
fractures his skull, then another that breaks his leg; the first driver is
73. Burlington Northern, 129 S. Ct. at 1881.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 433A(1)(b)(2) (1965) (emphasis
added).
75. Id. at § 433A cmt. a (emphasis added).
76. United States v. Saporito, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1061- 62 (N.D. 111. 2010)
(emphasis added).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 433A (1)(b)(2) (1965) (emphasis
added).
78. Id at subsection (2), cmt. i (emphasis added); See Gold, supra note 68, at
346-54 ("proper judicial treatment of multiple sufficient causes in the context of
CERCLA liability should result in joint and several liability"); Gelber, supra note
47, at 7 ("in cases where each party's contribution to the contamination on its own
would have been sufficient to warrant the response action taken by the United
States, the harm is not capable of being divided along any rational lines.").
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held liable for both fractures but the second only for the broken leg.79
This indicates that one defendant could be liable for 100% of a
divisible harm (that is, two distinct harms) while another is not.so
Furthermore, apportioned liabilities should never exceed 100%.
Apportioning a single harm is like dividing a pie; one may not want
to leave any in the pan unapportioned/uneaten, but one also cannot
create pieces that are not there in the first place or give the same
piece to two or more people. Should apportioned liabilities overlap
so they total more than 100% it would be the same as determining
that, with regard to the redundant portion, two or more defendants are
jointly and severally liable for that portion-thus defeating the whole
purpose of apportionment. Therefore, the portion of a single harm
which is not caused by a defendant asserting divisibility must be
caused by other tortfeasors or some other intervening cause or
causes.81 Under the Restatement, these can be innocent causes (such
as a force of nature, innocent conduct of the plaintiff or a third party,
or a pre-existing condition) or contributory negligence by the
plaintiff.82  Consequently, the underlying assumption is that if a
single harm is divisible and a defendant can show it is only
responsible for a portion of that harm, then some party or parties or
other causes are responsible for the rest, whether or not a judgment
can be obtained from them. Therefore, apportionment should never
leave the plaintiff with an unapportioned share, even though under
the Restatement, a tort plaintiff may be found responsible for certain
shares apportioned to innocent causes or contributory negligence 83
for which the defendant is not responsible. 84
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A subsection 1, cmt. c, illus. 2
(1965) ("Successive injuries").
80. See id. But see Reichold v. United States Metals Ref. Co., 655 F. Supp. 2d
(D.N.J. 2009).
81. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmts. e-f § 1
(1965).
82. Id. Note, however, that many of these common-law tort principles of the
Restatement, tied to "causation," do not easily transfer to the CERCLA statutory,
no-fault context, in which "negligence" and "causality" in the traditional tort sense
are not relevant. Therefore, for example, the concept of "innocent" causes as a
defense to joint and several liability is not applicable in CERCLA cases, although a
parallel exists in the "third-party" and "act of God" defenses of CERCLA § 107(b).
83. Note that contributory negligence is inapplicable in the strict liability
CERCLA context, although there is a parallel in the event of counterclaims against
the United States based on alleged federal agency liability. See 42 U.SC. §
107(a)(3)(2010), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2010); see also William B. Johnson,
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Third, unless the government's costs can be shown to reasonably
correspond to a distinct portion of the harm,8 5 apportionment of a
singular harm can entail ascribing a fraction or percentage to an
individual defendant's liability. In order to do so, both the numerator
and denominator (Cx and C, + C,, respectively, in the example
above) in addition to being comprised of common units of measure of
the same importance, must be reasonably capable of proof. In most
cases, particularly multiple "arranger" cases, one or the other will
not be capable of proof.8 7  For example, for an "arranger" party
alleging divisibility based on volume, the fraction representing that
divisible apportionment, D,, can be written:
Liability of federal government under § 107(a) of Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 127 A.L.R. Fed. 511, §8 (1995).
84. The question of whether or not the plaintiff should be forced through the
application of divisibility to absorb so-called "orphan" shares, that is, shares
attributable to insolvent or defunct responsible parties, was not directly addressed
by the Supreme Court in Burlington Northern. See Burlington Northern, 129 S. Ct.
1870. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmt. h (1965) gives as an
example of an inequitable application of divisibility: leaving the plaintiff to recover
from an insolvent or deceased defendant. The EPA's "orphan share" policies were
designed to allow government negotiators the discretion to grant limited past cost
credit for certain "orphan" shares as an incentive to settlement, precisely because a
jointly and severally liable defendant is not legally entitled to such a credit. Yet,
the Supreme Court did not scruple to leave the plaintiff government to cover most
of its costs, which the Court appears to have attributed either to the non-liable Shell
or the defunct "orphan" B&B. (Note that "orphan" shares attributable to insolvent
defendants should not be confused with the concept of unapportioned shares
discussed in this article: an "orphan" share is a share that can be quantified and
attributed but is uncollectible; an unapportioned share is a portion of the harm that
cannot be attributed to any specific cause.) See STEVEN A. HERMAN,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INTERIM GUIDANCE ON ORPHAN SHARE
COMPENSATION FOR SET-rLORS OF REMEDIAL DESIGN/REMEDIAL ACTION AND
NoN-TIME CRITICAL REMOVALS, June 3, 1996.
85. This would occur where divisibility is based on separate and distinct harms,
as opposed to a single harm capable of apportionment. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965) cmt. b § 1.
86. That is, multiple "generator" cases, where the responsible parties would be
liable under § 107(a)(3) of CERCLA, which imposes liability on "any person who.
. . arranged for disposal or treatment . .. of hazardous substances ... at any facility
. . . containing such hazardous substances." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (2010)
(Emphasis added).
87. See Gold, supra note 68, at 332 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
433A) cmt. d §§ 1(1965)).
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Vx + Vn
where Vx represents the volume of waste contributed by that party,
and V, + Vn1 represents the total volume of waste disposed of by all
responsible parties. Where either V or Vn cannot be established with
certainty, no "reasonable basis for apportionment" can be proven
even where a single harm is theoretically capable of apportionment.
One example can be found in the case of O'Neil v. Picillo, where
alleged divisibility based on the number of drums sent to a site by
generator or "arranger" defendants was rejected because it was
impossible to say whether or not more had been contributed by each
defendant. A numerator for each defendant could not be established
with any certainty. Similarly, where the total volume disposed
cannot reasonably be determined, as where disposal records are
incomplete or missing, the denominator applicable to all defendants
also cannot be determined.
On the other hand, with regard to owner-operators, geographic or
temporal evidence regarding divisibility may be determined relative
to total site area or time in operation with relative certainty-
although such measures may have no relevance at all to
generator/transporter liability.89 As an example, divisibility based on
area, Da, could be written:
Da Ax
Ax + A,
This requires both that the site area "owned" by the party alleging
the defense, Ax, and the total site area, Ax +An, be capable of proof.
88. 883 F.2d 176. 181-83 (1st Cir. 1989).
89. Liability under CERCLA § 107(a) is limited to certain classes of
defendants: current "owner/operators" of contaminated "facilities" under §
107(a)(1); owner/operators "at the time of disposal" under § 107(a)(2);
"generators" (sometimes called "arrangers") under § 107(a)(3); and "transporters"
to sites "selected by such persons" under § 107(a)(4). 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(1) -
(a)(4) (2010). Due to differences of proof, a distinction is often made between
"generator/transporter" or "owner/operator" responsible parties.
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Since "owner" liability is strict,90 such a showing might be relatively
easy for a site "owner," whereas the same proof as regards a
"generator" responsible party could be extremely imprecise or subject
to numerous complicating factors. The same could be said of time:
an "owner/operator" attempting to prove the numerator and
denominator in the following equation, where Dr is the percentage of
time in operation,
Tx1 + T.
might have no difficulty establishing the numerator, the precise
time of its ownership or operation, Tx, relative to total time in
operation, T, + T, whereas such a measure might have no bearing on
the liability of a "generator" defendant who may have sent various
types of waste to a site over a long period of time but sporadically
and in varying quantities. Thus, it should be obvious that a major
difficulty in establishing divisibility is presented by cases that involve
different classes of responsible parties. Divisibility in an "owner"
case, such as the Burlington Northern case (the Supreme Court
having absolved the only generator, Shell, of liability), may be easier
to establish than in a case involving multiple responsible parties
which include both owner/operators and generator/transporters since
a common unit of measure will be difficult to find in such cases.
Even more problematic is the question of proportionality:
qualitative uniformity among the causes of the harm as well as across
the harm itself. Even where an "owner" alleging divisibility can show
the precise acreage owned or time in operation, this may be
meaningless as a template for apportionment unless those units of
measure are uniformly related to the harm (as where production
records indicate uniform disposal practices over time of the same
contaminant). 91 Therefore, even where a numerator and denominator
can be proven as to a single theory, the resulting fraction may still not
provide a reasonable basis for apportionment because qualitative
uniformity across both the causes and the harm may be difficult or
90. See CERCLA § 107(a)(1) (2010), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (2010) (imposing
no-fault liability on facility "owners" and "operators").
91. See In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 903 (5th Cir. 1993).
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impossible to establish. Where a volumetric theory is alleged, for
example, "variable toxicity, variable mobility, and potential
interactions among the different chemicals in the mix" may make it
"unreasonable to simply assume that volume is a reasonable proxy
for harm." 92 The same could be said with regard to theories of area
and time. Mobility of contaminants could just as easily doom a
theory of divisibility based on area as on volume, and temporal
divisibility may be impossible to establish in the face of intermittent
disposal, as well as commingled and chemically interactive or
degradable contamination over time.
Finally, in finding a measure of the harm in CERCLA cost-
recovery actions, there is often a question as to whether the "harm" is
the environmental degradation that results from the actions of the
defendants or the costs to the government of cleaning it up.93 in
Burlington Northern, the Ninth Circuit examined this question by
postulating three views of the tort concept of "harm" in the statutory
CERCLA context: (a) the initial "disposal," (b) the site
"contamination" itself, and (c) the costs of remediating the
contamination. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, "[i]t is most useful
for purposes of determining divisibility to view the 'harm' under
CERCLA as the contamination traceable to each defendant." 94 The
cost of cleanup, the court went on, is "analogous to the damages
recovered in a tort suit," not the injury.95 It appears, therefore, that
for costs to act as a surrogate for the harm, they must be proportional
to it. However, many costs of cleanup at Superfund sites are not
proportional to the harm addressed, and for that reason may not
provide an adequate measure of the harm for divisibility purposes.96
Certain costs, for example, may be incurred despite the extent,
volume, or toxicity of the contamination; such as costs of drilling off-
92. Id.
93. See Gelber, supra note 47, at 3.
94. United States v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 502 F.3d 781, 798
(9th Cir. 2007).
95. Id.
96. See Gelber, supra note 47, at 7 ("Even if a defendant can prove its
contribution to the contamination, it may be difficult to divide the costs. For
example, defendants will have trouble establishing a reasonable basis for
apportioning site-wide costs-such as costs of investigation and remedy
development efforts-because such fixed costs normally are not proportionate to
the degree of contamination." (citing United States v. Alcan Alum. Corp., 97 F.
Supp. 2d 248, 274-75 (N.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd, 315 F. 3d 179 (2d Cir. 2003)).
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site monitoring wells to detect migration of a contaminant plume in
groundwater.9 7 Thus, even where some costs may be proportional to
the harm, others (such as investigative costs, certain indirect costs,
and remedy selection costs) may not be, since they would have been
incurred as a result of the defendants' actions whether the harm was
divisible or not and no matter what remedial measures were
required.98
III. DIVISIBILITY AFTER B URLINGTON NORTHERN
A. Has The Law Of CERCLA Divisibility Changed?
In a word, no.99 As mentioned above, in its opinion in Burlington
Northern, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's holding
97. Id. (stating that "[d]efendants will have trouble establishing a reasonable
basis for apportioning . .. costs of investigation and remedy development efforts.")
98. See, e.g., United States v. Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 64 F.3d 202, 206 (5th
Cir. 1995) (holding that even though court previously ruled design and construction
costs of alternate water supply system were unrecoverable as inconsistent with the
National Contingency Plan (NCP), ruling did not apply to costs of focused
feasibility study for the same work); Landsford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v.
Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1218-19 (3d Cir. 1993) (monitoring and evaluation
costs are recoverable if there is a reasonable risk, even if it may not materialize,
that defendant's actual or threatened release would contaminate property); Dedham
Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1157-58 (1st Cir.
1989) (holding that response costs, including investigative costs, are recoverable
even though defendant's contamination did not physically migrate to and in fact
contaminate plaintiffs wells); Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 735 F. Supp. 368,
371 (D. Colo. 1990) (holding defendants jointly and severally liable for the costs of
state's investigation); Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of New Castle County, 659 F.
Supp. 1269 (D. Del. 1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding county
liable for Artesian's monitoring and evaluation expenses, even if Artesian incurred
no further response costs cognizable under CERCLA); United States v. Wade, 577
F. Supp. 1326, 1333 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding costs "spent on investigating,
monitoring, testing, and evaluating" the site "traceable to the wastes of virtually
any party" as a matter of law).
99 See United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., No. 91-0768-JAM-JFM,
2010 WL 1854118 at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 5, 2010) (order denying defendants'
motion for reconsideration) ("Despite Defendants efforts to argue that Burlington
Northern established new law regarding apportionment, Plaintiffs are correct that
Burlington Northern does not constitute a change in law as required for
reconsideration. Burlington Northern simply reiterated the law as established in
1983 by Chem-Dyne, and then examined the record to resolve a factual question of
whether the record supported apportionment."); see also Ashley II of Charleston,
L.L.C. v. PCS Nitrogen, No. 2:05-cv-2782-MBS, 2010 WL 3893599, at *41
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that, of the three responsible parties, Shell (a generator), B&B (the
majority owner-operator), and the Railroads (minor owner-operators),
the Railroads were responsible for 19% of the geographic area, 45%
of the time of disposal, and 66.6% (two-thirds) of the principal
contaminants at the site.100 Multiplying these together yielded around
6%.101 Perhaps somewhat uncomfortable with this result, which, after
all, apportions a miniscule share to the Railroads relative to any of the
three factors taken alone, the district court then applied an uncertainty
factor of 50% (in effect, a multiplier of 150%) to bring the Railroads'
share to 9%.102 Thus the Railroads, found to be responsible for 19%
of the site area, 45% of the period of operation of the site, and at least
two-thirds of the waste disposed of on their own property, were
ultimately held responsible for only 9% of the total harm. Since the
principal site owner-operator, B&B, was defunct, and the Supreme
(D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2010) ("The court concurs with the Iron Mountain Mines court
that Burlington Northern did not change the law with regard to divisibility, but
merely recognized a reasonable basis for apportionment based on the facts of a
particular case.")
100. There is some question as to whether the district court intended its 2/3
multiplier for waste volume/toxicity to apply to site-wide contamination or just the
Railroad parcel. See United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., No.
CV-F-92-5068 OWW, No. CV-F-96-6226 OWW, No. CV-F-96-6228 OWW, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23130 at * 259-60, 489 (E.D. Cal. July, 14, 2003).
101. Id. at 488-89 (highlighting the district court's calculations regarding the
Railroad's share of liability). The Railroad parcel was found to consist of 0.9 acres
of the entire site area of 4.7 acres, or 19% of the site area (rounded down from
19.1%). The court found the Railroads' parcel was leased for 13 years of a total of
28 years of operation. Note that elsewhere in the opinion, see, e.g., 476, this
period is 29 years, which would yield 44.8%, whereas 13 divided by 28 gives
46.4%. But in any case, the court concluded that the lease period was 45% of total
time period of operation. The court then applied its 2/3 multiplier for
waste/toxicity, discussed in more detail infra (that is, .19 x .45 x 2/3, which yields
5.7%), to get "the relative figure of 6%." The court then concluded that
"[a]llowing for calculation errors up to 50%, the Railroads under no theory of
release of contaminants can be liable for more than 9% of the total Site CERCLA
response costs . . . ." Id. at 489. What the court meant by "calculation" errors is
open to speculation: it seems unlikely that arithmetical mistakes alone could
account for such a large margin of error. Yet the court did in fact apply a 150%
multiplier to bring its 6% to 9%, just one percent conveniently shy of the 10% the
court also concluded was the upper bound of the contribution of releases on the
Railroad parcel to "the volume or mass of the overall site contamination." Id.
(emphasis added).
102. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870,
1882 (2009).
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Court held that the only other viable defendant, Shell, was not liable
as an "arranger,'103 the plaintiff United States government (in effect,
the U.S. taxpayers) was left to absorb the vast majority of costs
expended in cleaning up the Site. 104
While the district court's calculations as to the time period of
operation and percentage of property owned by the Railroads are
fairly straightforward, the court's use of a two-thirds multiplier for
hazardous substances releases is shrouded in mystery. In all of the
court's lengthy, 191-page amended opinion, that included, according
to the Ninth Circuit, eighty pages of factual findings,'0 5 the only
rationale for this conclusion appears in one sentence, the conclusion
itself: "[e]stimates are that these two chemicals [Nemagon and
dinoseb] contributed to 2/3 of overall Site contamination." 0 6 It is
unclear whose estimates those were. Nemagon and dinoseb were two
of the three principal chemicals of concern released at the Site, the
other being Shell's soil fumigant, "D-D." Nemagon and dinoseb were
attributed to releases on the Railroad parcel, but they were also
released on the B&B parcel.107  Inexplicably, the court excluded
Shell's D-D from its conclusions regarding releases on the Railroad
parcel. Yet, as the Ninth Circuit pointed out, the record showed that
"[a]ll three chemicals were on the Railroad parcel at some time;"
leading that court to term the district court's decision to use a two-
thirds multiplier a "basic factual error."10 8 Indeed, the district court's
findings of fact clearly show that D-D "rigs," "nurse tanks," and
"bobtails," from which D-D leaks and spills regularly occurred, were
all parked at various times on the Railroad parcel. '0 9
103. Id. at 1880.
104. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at * 115, T
287 ("In total, EPA has spent at least $7,809,683.46 . . . analyzing and remediating
the Site, not including interest . . . ."). Judgment was entered for the United States
against the Railroads in the amount of $702,871.51 plus interest, as well as a
declaratory judgment for the United States against the Railroads for 9% of future
costs. Id., at *273.
105. United States v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 502 F.3d 781, 802
(9th Cir. 2007).
106. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *259, 488.
107. Id. at *21-22, 147, 51.
108. Burlington Northern, 502 F.3d at 804.
109. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *17-18, I 26-
41.
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Moreover, the court found that the "volume of hazardous
substances releasing activities on the B&B property is a least ten
times greater than any Railroad parcel releases," leading to the
conclusion that "based on the considerable evidence of the relative
levels of activity and number of releases on the two parcels, the
Railroad parcel could not have contributed to more than 10% of the
volume or mass of the overall site contamination."o10 Since the
district court found that releases on the Railroad parcel were
responsible for only 10% of the volume of site contamination, its use
of a two-thirds multiplier for hazardous substance releases
attributable to the Railroads implies either that it regarded the
Railroad parcel releases requiring remediation (which it concluded,
despite its contra factual findings, were limited to Nemagon and
dinoseb) to be site-wide and much more toxic than those on the B&B
parcel, or the court intended the two-thirds multiplier to apply only to
the Railroad parcel on the theory that there was no cross-migration of
those contaminants to the B&B parcel. However, the district court did
not say which it believed, and it is unclear whether either view is
supported by the factual record."
Whichever the district court intended, the Supreme Court adopted
the district court's two-thirds multiplier in its decision, stating that
the district court had concluded that "only spills of two chemicals,
Nemagon and dinoseb (not D-D), substantially contributed to the
contamination that had originated on the Railroad parcel and that
those two chemicals had contributed to two-thirds of the overall site
contamination requiring remediation."ll2 Therefore, the Supreme
Court appears to have accepted that the two-thirds multiplier
represented the contribution of releases from the Railroad parcel, for
which the Railroads were deemed responsible, to site-wide
110. Id. at *259-60, TT 488-89 (emphasis added).
111. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at
239-51 (finding that "EPA detected 1,2-DCP [a component of D-D] at
approximately 1200 parts per billion (ppb), greatly in excess of the MCL of 5 ppb"
in groundwater. Id. at *97-98, 246. However, it appears that the primary risk to
drinking water supplies may have been posed by "DBCP" migrating in the
groundwater. DBCP is a constituent of Nemagon. The court found that DBCP, "due
to its toxicity" in "very small quantities . . . in the low parts per billion, could ruin
drinking water supplies." Id. at *74, 1 190. Thus, the Railroad's releases might
have been regarded as more toxic than the B&B parcel releases if Nemagon had not
also been released on the B&B parcel. But the record shows otherwise).
112. Burlington Northern, 129 S. Ct. at 1882 (emphasis added).
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contamination. It is certainly plausible that the Supreme Court
reached the conclusion that the district court found the Railroad
releases to be twice as harmful as the B&B releases by taking both
volume and toxicity into consideration. Therefore, the better reading
of the district court's opinion may be that the two-thirds multiplier
was intended to represent the percentage of "overall site
contamination," including both soil and groundwater contamination,
attributable to releases from the Railroad parcel, as the Supreme
Court itself may have believed." 3
Although the district court's approach to apportionment was
eccentric, it must be stressed that the Supreme Court in Burlington
Northern did not make new law by affirming that approach. Rather,
the Court simply ruled that the record before the district court was
sufficient to support it.1 4 At the same time, as if to emphasize the
narrowness of its holding, the Supreme Court explicitly reaffirmed
the existing legal standard for CERCLA joint and several liability,
citing favorably decisions from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, and District of Columbia Circuits, which themselves had
reaffirmed that standard.' '5 The Court emphasized that the proper
standard for divisibility comes from the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, stating that "[n]ot all harms are capable of apportionment...
CERCLA defendants seeking to avoid joint and several liability bear
the burden of proving that a reasonable basis for apportionment
exists."ll6 The Court cited the seminal opinion of United States v.
Chem-Dyne, noting that the Chem-Dyne approach has been fully
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1881 (the question before the Supreme Court was "whether the record
provided a reasonable basis for the district court's conclusion that the Railroads
were liable for only 9% of the harm caused by contamination at the Arvin facility,"
the Court stating "we conclude that the facts contained in the record reasonably
supported the apportionment of liability." Id. at 1882-83.) Note that, to buttress its
holding that the record supported the district court's apportionment, the Supreme
Court also cited evidence from the district court's opinion that the spills which
occurred on the Railroads' parcel "contributed to no more than 10% of the total site
contamination," and also observed that had the district court "limited its
apportionment calculations to the amount of time the Railroad parcel was in use
and the percentage of the facility located on that parcel, it would have assigned the
Railroads 9% of the response costs." Id. at 1883. Thus the court does not appear to
have explicitly affirmed one apportionment method over another.
115. Id. at 1881.
116. Id.
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embraced by various federal appeals courts.' Divisibility, even
after Burlington Northern, thus remains a heavy burden for
responsible parties under Section 107 of CERCLA. Burlington
Northern did not change the basic standard for divisibility under
existing CERCLA case law and the Restatement. Furthermore,
because the Supreme Court held that the only party to the suit found
liable under CERCLA's "arranger" provisions, Shell, was not liable,
it is important to recognize that the Court's divisibility holding
applied only to the Railroads." 8 That is, its divisibility holding is
even further limited in scope: it only concerns "owner/operator"
liability under CERCLA Section 107(a)(1).119
Courts deciding CERCLA "divisibility" cases subsequent to
Burlington Northern have cited the case only to re-affirm the legal
standard for divisibility established by Chem-Dyne.120 Defendants'
motions for partial summary judgment as to divisibility have been
denied in other cases subsequent to Burlington Northern in light of
the intensely factual nature of the divisibility issue, and so that the
117. See id. at 1880; see also United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d
252, 269 (3d Cir. 1992).
118. Id. ("Having concluded that Shell is not liable as an arranger, we need not
decide whether the court of appeals erred in reversing the district court's
apportionment of Shell's liability for the cost of remediation.")
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Reichhold v. United States Metals Ref. Co., 655 F. Supp. 2d 400,
448 (D.N.J. 2009) (quoting Burlington Northern as stating the "seminal opinion"
on apportionment is Chem-Dyne and the "starting point for divisibility of harm
analyses in CERCLA cases" is Section 433A of the Restatement). However, note
that Reichhold appears wrongly decided under the standard set by the Supreme
Court in Burlington Northern. In Reichhold, the current owner Reichhold sued a
former owner-operator under CERCLA Section 107 for certain costs Reichhold
incurred cleaning up the site. The court, citing Burlington Northern, in effect split
the baby by "apportioning" half the costs to each party because, the court stated,
either party's actions alone would have caused the entire harm. Reichhold, at 448-
49. Since under the Restatement this is an indivisible harm, this case would appear
to be flawed based on that question alone (see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
433A cmt. 1 § 2 (1965) "joint and several liability is imposed where either cause
would have been sufficient in itself to bring about the result"); yet the court
compounded its error in "apportioning" liability by splitting costs equally between
the parties based on what can only be called equitable considerations, contrary to
the Supreme Court's admonition to avoid confusing apportionment with equitable
allocation. Id. See Burlington Northern, 129 S. Ct. at 1882, n. 9 ("equitable
considerations play no role in the apportionment analysis").
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evidentiary record can be more fully developed.121 In addition, the
federal courts have ruled against defendants claiming an entitlement
to apportionment under Burlington Northern.122
In Saporito, the court held the defendant, James Saporito, a current
site owner, jointly and severally liable despite an alleged divisibility
defense. The court found his partial ownership of equipment used in
the metal plating process that led to the contamination of the facility
dispositive, citing Section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which provides that apportionment is not appropriate for joint
venturers.123 The court held that the defendant had neither met his
burden of proof as to divisibility of the harm he jointly caused, nor
had he established a reasonable basis for apportionment, and granted
the government's motion that the defendant was jointly and severally
liable.124 In another recent ruling, the District Court for the Eastern
District of California held specifically that Burlington Northern did
not represent a change in the law of CERCLA divisibility.125 In this
instance, the defendants asked the court to reconsider a 2002 order
granting partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs that the
defendants were jointly and severally liable and rejecting the
defendants' divisibility defenses.126 The defendants argued that
Burlington Northern represented a "change in law" mandating
reconsideration.127 The court rejected that argument and agreed with
the plaintiffs that Burlington Northern "does not constitute a change
121. See ITT Corp v. Borgwarner, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-674, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 62792 at *16 (W.D. Mich. July 22, 2009); See also Evansville Greenway
and Remediation Trust v. S. Indiana Gas and Elec. Co., Inc., 661 F. Supp. 2d 989
(S.D. Ind. 2009).
122. See United States v. Saporito, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (N.D. Ill. 2010);
Appleton Papers Inc. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 2009 WL 3931036 (E.D.
Wis. Nov. 19, 2009).
123. Saporito, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1062; See Gold, supra note 68, at 338-46
(discussing "concert of action" theories).
124. Saporito, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.
125. See United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., No. 91-0768-JAM-JFM,
2010 WL 1854118 at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 5, 2010) (order denying defendants'
motion for reconsideration); see also Ashley II of Charleston LLC v. PCS
Nitrogen, No. 2:05-cv-2782-MBS, 2010 WL 3893599, at *41 (D.S.C. Sept. 30,
2010) ("The court concurs with the Iron Mountain Mines court that Burlington
Northern did not change the law with regard to divisibility, but merely recognized a
reasonable basis for apportionment based on the facts of a particular case.").
126. Iron Mountain Mines, 2010 WL at *2.
127. Id. at *4.
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in law ... [but] simply reiterated the law as established in 1983 by
Chem-Dyne."l 2 8 The Supreme Court in Burlington Northern merely
held that the factual record supported the lower court's decision, the
California court stated.129
Furthermore, even though the district court's Burlington Northern
opinion reveals some confusion between apportionment based on
divisibility of harm, and equitable allocation, the Supreme Court
itself clearly distinguished between the two.1 30 The Court made clear
in a footnote that the district court erred in making reference to
equitable considerations, which the Supreme Court said play no role
in the apportionment analysis.131 Equitable factors come into play in
the contribution context only, the Court stated, citing § 113(f)(1) of
CERCLA, which states that in resolving contribution claims, a court
may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable
factors as the court determines are appropriate.' 32 Thus, the Court
did not give encouragement to those who would argue for a melding
of the two procedures in the interests of judicial economy or for other
reasons.
The distinction between apportionment of divisible liability and
allocation in the contribution context cannot be overemphasized,
since the two are often confused. As an example, one has only to look
at the district court's opinion in Burlington Northern, which the
Supreme Court clearly stated was erroneous insofar as the district
court made reference to equitable considerations favoring
apportionment. 133 A determination of theoretical divisibility is a
matter of law and can be resolved at the liability phase of CERCLA
litigation, although factual development as to apportionment may be
128. Id. at *6.
129. Id. (quoting Burlington Northern: "we conclude that the facts contained in
the record reasonably supported the apportionment of liability." 129 S. Ct. at 1882-
83).
130. 129 S. Ct. at 1882, n. 9.
13 1. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. See Reichold, Inc. v. United States Metals Ref. Co., 655 F. Supp. 2d 400
(D.N.J. 2009); Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. NL Indus., 648 F. Supp. 2d
840, n. 31 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2009) (restating the Supreme Court's finding in
Burlington Northern that the CERCLA apportionment analysis is different from the
allocation analysis, and equitable factors play no role in apportionment).
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necessary.134 Allocation, on the other hand, is applied among jointly
liable defendants asserting contribution claims against one another,
and usually requires a separate proceeding conducted after the
liability phase of multi-party CERCLA litigation and the
development of a separate set of facts which may include equitable
considerations. 3 5
In short, there would appear to be nothing in the Supreme Court's
opinion to alter the established jurisprudence of CERCLA divisibility
as articulated by federal courts over the past three decades.136 The
opinion is unusual only in its approval of the district court's
discretion in two respects: (1) its sua sponte consideration of multiple
theories of divisibility in apportioning harm,' 37 and (2) its resolution
of the considerable differences in results produced by those theories
through multiplication alone.138 In the vast majority of CERCLA fact
scenarios, neither approach is likely to be repeated in the future by a
134. See, e.g., United States v. Broderick Inv. Co., 862 F. Supp 272, 276 (D.
Colo. 1994) ("Under the Restatement and Bell, the decision of whether to impose
joint and several liability turns on whether there is a reasonable basis for dividing
liability. This is a question of law . . . . the actual apportionment of the harm is a
question of fact.") (citing In re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889, 896 (5th Cir.
1993)).
135. See United States v. Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 318-20 (6th Cir. 1998)
(rejecting the "Gore" factors for purposes of apportionment, the court stated: "We
distinguish the divisibility defense to joint and several liability from the equitable
allocation principles available to defendants under CERCLA's contribution
provision. The former is legal, the latter equitable."); United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 270, n.29 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding the
"divisibility" inquiry "is best resolved at the initial liability phase and not at the
contribution phase since it involves precisely relative degrees of liability.")
(emphasis in original); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160,171 n.22 (4th
Cir. 1988) ("equitable factors are relevant in subsequent actions for contribution
[but] . . . are not pertinent to the question of joint and several liability, which
focuses principally on the divisibility among responsible parties of the harm to the
environment.").
136. Note that Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983), as demonstrated
above, has been followed by the federal courts up to and including the Supreme
Court in its 2009 Burlington Northern opinion. See 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
137. As noted above, the defense of divisibility was not briefed by either side
before the district court. Thus, in the words of Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, the
district court "undertook a heroic labor" in striving "independently" to perform its
own apportionment analysis, "sua sponte." Burlington Northern, 129 S. Ct. at
1885-86.
138. See infra pp 36-47.
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district court adhering to the principles of Chem-Dyne and the
Restatement affirmed in Burlington Northern.
B. Dueling Theories
Perhaps the most unusual feature of the district court's approach to
divisibility in Burlington Northern was the court's use of multiple
factors or theories of divisibility to arrive at an apportionment. This
was so alien to the decades-old standard set down in Chem-Dyne that
it casts doubt on the possible future use of such a method by any
federal court adhering to that standard in the overwhelming majority
of cases. This is because the use of multiple factors, each of which
really constitutes a separate theory of divisibility, may create such
uncertainty as to render their use ineffectual in proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that a reasonable basis exists for
apportioning a single harm. This is even more troubling where the
results under each theory diverge significantly.
Using the percentages the district court assigned to the Railroads
based on area, time, and waste volume/toxicity, 19%, 45% and
66.6%, respectively, Figure 2 represents the three theories of
divisibility presented in Burlington Northern, where C represents the
causes, respectively, of ownership (a or area), operation (t or time),
and disposal (v or volume/toxicity), and H, the single harm associated
with those causes.
2011] 345
346 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Figure 2
0% 19% 45% 66% 100%
H
As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court pointed out that the
district court confused apportionment with equitable allocation-
nevertheless the Supreme Court held it "harmless" error. 139 The
district court did, in fact, include a recital in its opinion of the "Gore
factors" which it said should be taken into account in "apportioning"
liability.140 These are equitable factors adopted by the federal courts
in contribution allocation pursuant to § 113(f)(1) of CERCLA, which
requires allocation "using such equitable factors as the court
determines are appropriate." The "Gore factors" as recited by the
district court include, inter alia, "the ability of the parties to
demonstrate that their contribution of a discharge [,] release or
disposal of a hazardous waste can be distinguished," "the amount of
the hazardous waste involved," and "the degree of involvement by
the parties in the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or
disposal of the hazardous waste."14 1 This indicates that the district
court may simply have regarded its three "factors" as "equitable
factors" to be balanced in arriving at an allocation, not as separate
139. Burlington Northern, 129 S. Ct. at 1883.
140. United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. CV-F-92-5068
OWW, No. CV-F-96-6226 OWW, No. CV-F-96-6228 OWW, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23130 at *242, 463 (E.D. Cal. July, 14, 2003).
141 Id.
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theories of divisibility apportionment.142 However, in finding the
harm theoretically divisible, the district court did indicate that it
regarded the harm as divisible based on at least two separate theories
of divisibility, time period of ownership/operation and
volume/toxicity of hazardous substance releases: "[t]his is a classic
'divisible in terms of degree' case, both as to the time period in which
defendants' conduct occurred, and ownership existed, and as to the
estimated maximum contribution of each party's activities that
released hazardous substances that caused Site contamination."1 4 3
Therefore, there is some basis in the district court's opinion for
regarding its "factors" as separate theories of divisibility, each of
which alone might demonstrate a reasonable basis for apportionment.
The Ninth Circuit seems to have adopted this view, since its opinion
struck down all three "factors" sequentially as if they were, in fact,
separate theories of divisibility. 144 The Ninth Circuit concluded that,
with regard to "land area," "the mere percentage of land owned by
one PRP relative to the entire facility cannot alone be a basis for
apportionment."l 45 Similarly, with regard to "period of ownership"
the court stated: "[j]ust as the district court's land area calculations
did not correspond to the harms in this case, its simple fraction based
on the time that the Railroads owned the land cannot be a basis for
apportionment."l46 Further, with regard to the third "factor," "types
of hazardous products," the Ninth Circuit found that "the district
court clearly erred in its attempt to rely on the proportion of
hazardous products present on the Railroad parcel."l 47
While each theory might have constituted a self-sufficient means of
apportionment given adequate factual development showing
proportionality to the harm, the district court did not rely on one, but
all three.14 8 However, in the context of apportionment, as opposed to
allocation, more is not more but less, because taken together the three
142. In fact, the district court placed its recital of the "Gore" factors under a
section heading titled "Equitable Apportionment," indicating the court's confusion
as to which principle, allocation or apportionment, it was following. Id. at *240.
143. Id. at *240, 462 (emphasis added).
144. United States v. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 502 F.3d 781,
802-4 (9th Cir. 2007).
145. Id. at 802 (emphasis added).
146. Id., at 803 (emphasis added).
147. Id., at 804 (emphasis added).
148. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *259-60.
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theories only create uncertainty. Assuming the harm is theoretically
divisible on the basis of any one of the three theories diagramed in
Figure 2, the Railroads might have been found liable for 66.6% under
one theory, 45% under another theory, and 19% under a third: a
47.6% difference. Even if the harm is considered theoretically
divisible under any one of these three theories, under all of them the
divergence among the results is nearly 50%. What do such wide
differences in result imply? Are we to expect that, where multiple
theories of apportionment are urged, all are equally proportional to
the harm? Consider, for example, whether a division of liability
based on land area, giving 19% to the Railroads on the assumption
that the "degree" of ownership of a portion of the Site constituted a
proportional relationship to the total site harm, is just as proportional
to that harm as the percentage of time that parcel was in operation
relative to the total period of Site operation, 45%, or the percentage
of hazardous substance disposal on the Railroad parcel, 66.6%?
Doesn't this juxtaposition call into question whether any of the three
separate theories alone are proportional to the harm? And how,
exactly, would multiplication of those percentages, none of which
would seem to be proportional to the harm separately, cure this
deficiency?
Such a high degree of uncertainty would appear to make any
attempt at apportionment of the harm the "arbitrary apportionment
for its own sake" the Restatement condemns, as cited by the Supreme
Court in Burlington Northern.149 As Judge Parker stated in his
dissenting opinion in Bell Petroleum:
[w]hile certainty of proof is not required in civil cases,
probability is. Evidence by 'fifty-one percent,' or to the
extent of 'more likely than not,' is deemed sufficiently
reliable for resolution of civil disputes. But proof by less
149. Burlington Northern v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1881 (2009). Note
that, as mentioned above, the district court actually applied a 150% multiplier to its
6% apportioned share for the Railroads, getting 9% as the Railroad's apportioned
share, although the court did not provide a rationale for using that multiplier.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *65.
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than this amount is unacceptably speculative; and amounts
to mere possibility, not probability. 5 0
In Township ofBrighton the Sixth Circuit held:
[d]ivisibility analysis is not an invitation to courts to
attempt to 'split the difference.' If they are in doubt, district
courts should not settle on a compromise amount that they
think best approximates the relative responsibility of the
parties. Rather, if they are in doubt, they should impose
joint and several liability. Only if they have a reasonable
basis for dividing causation should they actually apportion
the damages.' 5 1
As emphasized above, if one examines the few pre-Burlington
Northern CERCLA cases in which divisibility has been successfully
raised, there is a common thread: only one theory of divisibility
prevailed. 152 It would seem, therefore, that a theory of divisibility has
the best chance of success if there are no other possible theories of
divisibility or other evidence to be considered. In fact, where the
defense has been successful, one theory of divisibility has been found
dispositive and other possible theories to be considered, as well as
other complicating factors such as toxicity, mobility, and synergistic
effects of the contaminants have been found similar for all other
defendants or of minimal significance to the divisibility analysis.153
This indicates that in the overwhelming majority of cases where
divisibility of harm is alleged, evidence as to the extent of that harm
will probably depend on one theory alone, not the multiple theories
150. In re Bell Petroleum Servs, Inc., 3 F.3d 909-10 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting
William M. Prosser, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 222 § 42 (2nd ed.
1955) ("[M]ere possibility of . .. causation is not enough . . . and when the matter
remains one of pure speculation or conjecture . . . or the probabilities are at best
evenly balanced . . . it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the
defendant.")).
151. United States v. Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 319 (6th Cir. 1998).
152. See Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 894; Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Asarco, 280 F.
Supp. 2d 1094, 1120 (D. Idaho 2003); United States v. Broderick Inv. Co., 862 F.
Supp. 272, 276 (D. Colo. 1994); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 836 F. Supp.
1049, 1087-88 (D.N.J. 1993).
153. See Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 894; Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 280 F. Supp. 2d at
1120; Broderick, 862 F. Supp. at 276; Hatco, 836 F. Supp. at 1087-88.
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of divisibility the district court took into consideration in Burlington
Northern.
The few pre-Burlington Northern cases where the defense has been
successful bear this out. For example, in Bell Petroleum, the Fifth
Circuit found divisibility where a series of plant owners conducting
substantially the same chrome-plating operations discharged similar
waste, containing the same hazardous substance, chromium, over
different periods of time.15 4 The Bell Petroleum court held that
defendant Sequa met its burden of proving there was a rational basis
for apportioning liability among the defendants on a volumetric
basis.s55  The court reasoned that, although it is not possible to
determine with absolute certainty the exact amount of chromium each
defendant introduced, there was "sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable and rational approximation of each defendant's individual
contribution to the contamination" could be made.1 56 This included
evidence of chrome flake purchases during each operator's tenure,
the value of chrome-plating done by each, summaries of sales, time
in operation, and witness testimony regarding the wastewater
disposal practices of each defendant and the amount of chrome-
plating done by each. '5 However, it is important that the court,
although relying upon evidence of a widely disparate nature,
ultimately made its determination of divisibility based on one theory
alone: volume. 58 Additionally, it appears that the court adopted that
approach largely because no other significant variables affected the
result. In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Chem-Dyne
approach to divisibility based on the Restatement, citing with
approval US. v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc.'5 9 In
that case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the imposition of joint and
154. Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 903.
155. Id. at 904 (emphasis added). Note that the appeals court in Bell chastised
the district court below for "rejecting apportionment because of competing
theories," stating that "[t]he existence of competing theories of apportionment is an
insufficient reason to reject all of those theories." Id. Nevertheless, the court found
divisibility based on only one theory, volumetric contribution.
156. Id. at 903.
157. Id. at 904-5.
158. Id. at 903-4.
159 United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp.
984 (D.S.C. 1986), aff'd in part and vacated in part, United States v. Monsanto Co.,
858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).
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several liability against generator defendants claiming divisibility
based on evidence of their volumetric contributions; noting that the
defendants had presented "[n]o evidence. . .showing a relationship
between waste volume, the release of hazardous substances, and the
harm at the site."l'60 The Fourth Circuit noted that "volumetric
contributions provide a reasonable basis for apportioning liability
only if it can be reasonably assumed, or it has been demonstrated, that
independent factors had no substantial effect on the harm to the
environment."1 61 The Fifth Circuit in Bell Petroleum drew from this
an affirmative: that volume could be a reasonable basis for
apportioning liability in a situation in which independent factors had
no substantial effect on the harm to the environment. 162 Accordingly,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that, as a matter of law, there was a
reasonable basis for apportionment based on evidence of the
respective quantities of waste disposed of by each defendant, and
remanded the case for volumetric apportionment.163 The Fifth Circuit
was quick to point out, however, that the facts in Bell Petroleum were
conducive to this result largely because of the absence of other
complicating factors such as are found at most Superfund sites, so
that the harm caused by each defendant was proportionate to the
volume discharged by each:
[a]s is evident from our previous discussion of the
jurisprudence, most CERCLA cost-recovery actions
involve numerous, commingled hazardous substances with
synergistic effects and unknown toxicity. In contrast, this
case involves only one hazardous substance-chromium-
and no synergistic effects. The chromium entered the
groundwater as the result of similar operations by three
parties who operated at mutually exclusive times. Here, it
is reasonable to assume that the respective harm done by
each of the defendants is proportionate to the volume of
160. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d at 172.
161. Id. at n. 27 (emphasis added) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §
433A cmt. d, illus.4, 5 (1965)).
162. Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 900 (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 904.
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chromium-contaminated water each discharged into the
environment.164
Note also that these facts demonstrate qualitative uniformity in
both cause and harm: all defendants disposed of the same waste at
approximately the same rate, and the harm could be measured in
terms of "degree" because there was only one contaminant,
chromium.
In the same vein, a volumetric divisibility defense was successful
in Coeur D'Alene Tribe v. Asarco Inc., since the defendant showed
that the volume of waste disposed of, taken alone, could be measured
to a reasonable degree.' 65 The Coeur D'Alene basin had become
contaminated over the past century by waste discharged to local
waterways from a number of mining operations, leaving much of the
basin contaminated with commingled mine tailings, including
pollution from cadmium, lead, and zinc.1 66 Although the harm would
appear, therefore, to be singular, the various mining company
defendants claimed that it could be apportioned based on the volume
of tailings produced by each defendant or its predecessors.' 67
Evidence presented showed that all tailings from the area contained
relatively similar levels of cadmium, zinc, and lead, with differences
from mine to mine being insignificant.16 8 The district court of Idaho
therefore found a "reasonable relationship" existed between the
volume of mine tailings produced alone and the harm done at the
site.169 The court distinguished US. v. Monsanto, stating:
[t]he [c]ourt finds the present case distinguishable from
United States v. Monsanto Company. In Monsanto there
was no evidence that each generator was contributing the
same type and quantity of hazardous substance. In the case
at bar, sufficient evidence was presented by the Plaintiffs
that establishes each generator was contributing tailings
164. Id., at 903.
165. Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Asarco, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1120 (D. Idaho
2003).
166. Id. at 1100-01, 1120.
167. Id. at 1119.
168. Id. at 1105-06.
169. Id. at 1120.
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and all of the tailings released contained lead, cadmium and
zinc. Even though the exact percentages of lead, cadmium
and zinc in the tailings from each mill is unknown and
differed slightly based on the type of metal being extracted
in the milling process, the [c]ourt finds the milling
methodologies used in the Basin did not differ significantly
from mill to mill to preclude divisibility based on the
volume of tailings generated.170
The court concluded that there is a reasonable relationship between
the waste volume, the release of hazardous substances, and the harm
at the site.' 7  This conclusion was due to the absence of independent
factors as well as qualitative uniformity across both the causes and
the harm. The court found that volume alone was sufficient to
establish divisibility because the site waste was fairly uniform in
composition, the hazardous substances were substantially the same,
and all the defendants disposed of similar waste.' 72
In United States v. Broderick Investment. Co., defendant
Burlington Northern Railroad Company ("BN") argued that the harm
was divisible both temporally and by geographic apportionment.17 3
The site consisted of two separate lots, owned or leased by Broderick
and BN at different times, which contributed to two separate
groundwater plumes contaminated primarily by pentachlorophenol.1 74
Furthermore, the record showed that the two plumes, emanating from
each lot,175 had not merged underground.176 The United States
District Court for the District of Colorado found that "the
environmental harm at the Site is not reasonably capable of
apportionment on a chronological basis," but that the harm was
170. Id. at 1120. See United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 172, n. 27 (4th
Cir. 1988) ("[V]olumetric contributions provide a reasonable basis for
apportioning liability only if it can be reasonably assumed, or it has been
demonstrated, that independent factors had no substantial effect on the harm to the
environment.") (emphasis added).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1120-21.
173. United States v. Broderick Inv. Co., 862 F. Supp. 272, 276 (D. Colo. 1994).
174. Id. at 275.
175. Id. at 277.
176. Id.
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divisible geographically.177 The court summarized the defendant's
argument as follows: BN "presented two arguments to support
divisibility: first, that the harm was divisible by chronology or time
period; and second, that there were separate and distinct geographic
areas of contamination." 78 The defendant BN was held liable only
for contamination of soil and groundwater emanating from its own
lot. The court declined "to adopt any specific percentages at this
time" and reserved "for a later phase of the case application of these
findings to the response costs that may be proved by the United
States." 79
Although the district court in Broderick merely concluded that the
harm was "divisible geographically," it appears that it based its
decision on the conclusion that the two contaminant plumes
constituted separate, distinct harms. It is significant, however, that in
addition to the complete separation of the two groundwater plumes
geographically, both contained the same contaminant,
pentachlorophenol, which the court acknowledged "drives the
groundwater remedy selection by the EPA."180 Consequently, the
court was not faced with the obstacle that might otherwise have been
present if each plume had contained different contaminants with
varying environmental effects, thus requiring different response
actions.
Therefore, in CERCLA cases prior to Burlington Northern where a
single harm was found to be capable of apportionment among two or
more independent causes, the reasonableness of that determination
depended largely upon the reliability of a single theory of
apportionment. This is because, where complex interrelated facts
are necessary for a divisibility determination, the more difficult it
becomes to establish a reliable and quantifiable correspondence
between a defendant's actions and the resulting harm. As the United
States District Court for the District of Idaho stated in Coeur
D'Alene, "evidence supporting divisibility must be concrete and
177. Id.
178. Id. (emphasis added).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See id.; In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 894 (5th Cir. 1993);
Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Asarco, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1120 (D. Idaho 2003);
United States v. Broderick Inv. Co., 862 F. Supp. 272, 276 (D. Colo. 1994); Hatco
Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 836 F. Supp. 1049, 1087-88 (D.N.J. 1993).
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specific.. . .Where causation is unclear, divisibility is not an
opportunity for courts to 'split the difference' in an attempt to
achieve equity."' 82 Without a "concrete and specific" correspondence
between cause and harm, any attempt at apportionment is likely to be
what the Restatement calls an "arbitrary" exercise:
[w]here two or more causes combine to produce such a
single result, incapable of division on any logical or
reasonable basis, and each is a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm, the courts have refused to make an
arbitrary apportionment for its own sake, and each of the
causes is charged with responsibility for the entire harm.183
C. The Sorcerer's Apprentice: Multiplication
It is important to recognize that in attempting to resolve competing
theories of divisibility by straight multiplication of the fractions or
percentages derived from each, the district court in Burlington
Northern used a flawed method. The district court's methodology
recalls the dilemma of the sorcerer's apprentice beset by multiplying
brooms in the famous tale adapted by Goethe in Der
Zauberlehrling,184 except that a court's multiplication of fractions,
instead of an overabundance, can create an equally dramatic
diminution in liability. In so doing, a court using multiplication may
call up another disturbing apparition: an unapportioned share for the
plaintiff to absorb.
The district court in Burlington Northern multiplied fractions or
percentages assigned to all three theories of divisibility together to
arrive at an apportioned share for the Railroads. Since multiplication
of fractions can only give incrementally smaller fractions, the district
court's method may not account for all the harm and can work a
182. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1120.
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §. 433A, subsection 2, cmt. i, (1965)
(emphasis added). See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States, 129
S.Ct. 1870, 1881 ("When two or more causes produce a single, indivisible harm,
'courts have refused to make an arbitrary apportionment for its own sake, and each
of the causes is charged with responsibility for the entire harm."').
184. The Sorcerer's Apprentice, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
The Sorcerer's_Apprentice. (September 19, 2010). The tale was later depicted in
the 1940 animated Disney film, Fantasia. See id.
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serious inequity by leaving the plaintiff with an artificially-created
unapportioned share. An exception might be multiplication of area
by time, which can be viewed as a single theory of apportionment
based on a function of two independent space-time variables. This
might be appropriate under certain factual scenarios; however, such
multiplication was inappropriate under the facts presented in
Burlington Northern because multiplication of space-time factors
only makes sense where the factors to be multiplied are proportional
to the harm. As the Ninth Circuit pointed out in its Burlington
opinion, that condition was not present at the Arvin site.Iss
Furthermore, even if it had been reasonable to rely on multiplication
of area by time in apportioning harm, further multiplication by a
percentage representing waste disposal would not be reasonable since
waste disposal, as a variable dependent on both area and time,
constitutes a separate and distinct theory of divisibility.
1.Accounting For 100% Of The Harm
As should be self-evident, in multiplying fractions representing
separate theories of apportionment, the result is always a smaller
fraction than any of the original fractions. As a result, a significant
portion of the harm can remain entirely unaccounted for: no one can
know its cause, yet the innocent plaintiff will be forced to accept
responsibility for it. As an example, consider a hypothetical where
there are only two responsible parties, both site "owner/operators" of
separate parcels of equal size comprising a Superfund site and each
party operating for half the total period of site operation. Let's say
further that each defendant while in operation disposed of an equal
volume of the same waste at the same rate, that the contaminants are
evenly distributed across the site, and that together these two volumes
account for all the waste at the site. Assuming that a court finds the
harm is theoretically divisible and that it is capable of reasonable
apportionment based on these facts, using the district court's
approach in Burlington Northern, each of the two owners could be
found to have divisible liability for 50% of the site area, 50% of the
time in operation, and 50% of the waste volume.' 86 Common sense
185. 502 F.3d 781, 802-4 (9th Cir. 2007).
186. This assumes that the court declines to hold both defendants liable for the
entire harm at the site by virtue of their statutory liability as current site owners
under Section 107(a)(1) of CERCLA.
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tells us that each defendant therefore should be liable for 50% of the
harm, yet if these three fractions are multiplied, each would be found
liable for only 12.5%. Clearly under these facts multiplication of the
three factors alone would not achieve a satisfactory result since the
plaintiff would be left to absorb a huge 75% unapportioned share; a
share that cannot be attributed to any cause.187
That the Burlington Northern district court might have failed to
account for all the harm through straight multiplication of all three
factors is demonstrated by Table I which shows, with regard to the
Railroads as against all other causes, the relative percentages of
divisible liability for the three theories the district court used, along
with the totals arrived at through multiplication. When the products
for both the Railroads and all other causes excluding the Railroads
(i.e., B&B and Shell) are added together, only 20.5% of the total
liability appears to be accounted for. That seems to leave 79.5% of
the harm unapportioned: seemingly due to no cause whatever. 8 8
Table 1
Burlington Northern Multiplication
Factors Railroads All Totals
Other
Causes
Area 19% 81% 100%
Time 45% 55% 100%
Waste 66.6% 33.3% 100%
(volume/toxicity)
Multiplied 5.7% 14.8% 20.5%
187. See Walter Mugdan, The Burlington Court's Flawed Arithmetic, 40 ENVTL.
L. REP.: NEWS & ANALYSIS 10637, 10638 (2010).
188. Of course, this would only result if the liability of all the other defendants is
limited to 80.9% of the area, 55% of the time of operation, and 33.3% of the waste
disposed. Whether correctly or not under the principles of Chem-Dyne and the
Restatement, B&B's share alone would probably have been found much larger than
that. See 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
433A (1965).
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To leave an unapportioned share for the plaintiff is contrary to the
intent of § 433A, comment h of the Restatement, which states that
divisibility should not be applied where it would work an injustice
by, for example, leaving the plaintiff to recover from an insolvent or
deceased defendant. 189 In the case of an unapportioned share, that
inequity is even more pronounced. § 433A, comment d states that
divisibility should not be applied if injustice to any of the parties-in
this case the plaintiff government-would result.190 Such a method
goes against the entire rationale for divisibility: that a single harm
may be apportioned if its component causes are capable of division in
such a way as to reflect the proportion of harm caused, since an
unapportioned share is attributable to no cause whatsoever.
Therefore, in apportioning harm, as emphasized above, 100% of the
harm must be accounted for.
The question then becomes: if straight multiplication of all three
percentages was flawed, what is the right method? In order to
answer that question, we must first ask: is it possible to apportion
harm at all by mathematically resolving more than one competing
theory of divisibility? It is tempting based on the analysis above to
assert that no such thing is possible-consistent with the principles of
the Restatement and the judicial precedent endorsed by the Supreme
189. Note, however, that the district court appears to have rejected the argument
that apportionment cannot leave an "orphan" share. See United States v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. CV-F-92-5068 OWW, No. CV-F-96-6226 OWW,
No. CV-F-96-6228 OWW, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23130 at *242-51 (E.D. Cal.
July, 14, 2003); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmt. h (1965)
(Exceptional cases) ( which reads in its entirety as follows: The rule stated in
Clause (b) of Subsection (1) [divisibility] is one normally applicable to cases in
which a reasonable basis can be found for the division of a single harm according
to the contribution of each cause. Exceptional cases may, however, arise in which
injustice to the plaintiff may result from an application of the rule. It may, for
example, appear that one of two tortfeasors is so hopelessly insolvent that the
plaintiff will never be able to collect from him the share of the damages allocated to
him; or, in a jurisdiction in which actions for the particular tort do not survive the
death of the defendant, he may have died after the infliction of the harm, but before
suit has been instituted. In such cases the application of the rule stated in Clause
(b) would mean that the innocent plaintiff would be forced to bear the share of the
loss due to the defendant from whom he could not collect the damages, and the
liability of the other tortfeasor would be reduced accordingly.).
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS at cmt. d. (emphasis added) (stating in
part, with regard to divisibility: "Where such apportionment can be made without
injustice to any of the parties, the court may require it to be made.").
[VOL. XXII
ALL IS NUMBER
Court in Burlington Northern-particularly where the results are
significantly divergent. Where competing theories of equal weight
give widely differing results, the harm simply may be said not to be
capable of reasonable apportionment. Therefore, in most fact
scenarios, divisibility arguments with any hope of success will
continue to be based on one theory alone. Yet the Supreme Court did
not rule that the Burlington Northern district court abused its
discretion when it attempted to resolve competing theories.191 One
must assume that, in an appropriate case, another court may accept,
first, that a harm is divisible based on more than one factor or
hypothesis of divisibility, and second, that a reasonable basis for
apportionment exists through resolution of those competing theories.
In that event, what should the court do?
Whatever approach a court may take, it should be obvious from the
preceding discussion that it must, at the very least, accomplish one
thing: account for 100% of the harm. A court cannot leave an
unapportioned share even though there may be apportioned shares
which are uncollectible due to "innocent" causes or contributory
negligence in the tort context or insolvency of a CERCLA
responsible party as in Burlington Northern. Furthermore, a court
should not reach a result which falls outside the range of the
component theories: where multiple theories of equal importance or
"weight" give a lower and upper bound, to adopt a method of
integration of those theories that gives a result falling outside that
range would not appear justified.
One method which would account for 100% of the harm and stay
within the range of the component theories would be to find the
arithmetic mean of the percentages assigned to each theory. In other
words, straight averaging of the three percentages was one approach
the district court might have taken in Burlington Northern. This
appeals to common sense since averaging evenly balances the three
competing theories (all of which are assumed to be of equal
significance or weight); it falls within their range, and the total of the
191. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1883
(2009) ("[W]e are persuaded that it was reasonable for the court to use the size of
the leased parcel and the duration of the lease as a starting point for its analysis,"
quoting from the Ninth Circuit's observation that "divisibility may be established
by 'volumetric, chronological, or other types of evidence,' including geographic
considerations." (quoting United States v. Burlington & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d
918, at 936, n.18. (9th Cir. 2008))).
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averages would be 100%--ensuring that all the harm is accounted for
and there is no unapportioned share. This last point can be
demonstrated mathematically as follows: if one individual
defendant's liability is x percent (as a fraction of one), then that
portion of the harm "caused" by all other defendants or causes can be
written (1 - x), and the two percentages will always add up to 100%
or (if written as fractions) one:
x+(1 -x) 1
If the number of divisibility theories or "factors" is n, the average
of percentages x, y, z . .n (one for each factor) attributable to a
defendant alleging divisibility,
(x+y+z+.. .+n)
n
when added to the average of the remainder percentages for each
factor attributable to all other causes-
(1 -x)+(1 -y)+(1 -z)+. .. +(1-n)
n
will still always equal one because the positive and negative values
for x, y, z . .. n will cancel each other out. Thus, straight averaging
will always account for 100% of the harm.
Note that straight averaging assumes that all of the theories are of
equal "weight" or significance. If that were not the case, one might
expect a defendant to rely exclusively on the best or most significant
of the competing theories-presumably the one proportional, or more
nearly proportional, to the harm. However, should a multiple-factor
averaging approach be used where the factors are considered unequal
in significance, a weighted average could be taken whereby arbitrary
(that is, elective) "weights" or multipliers, [w1 , w2,... wj, could be
applied to one or more factors. If for example a single weight w were
applied to x factor, where there are n factors, x, y, z, . .. n, the
numerator would become [w(x) + y + z +. . . + n], and the
denominator, instead of n, would be [(n - 1) + w]; with two
multipliers, the denominator would be [(n - 2) + w1 + w2 ], and so on.
This is similar to finding the weighted mean of a set of data [xt,
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x 2, . . ., x,] to which are applied non-negative weights [wi, w2. . .*,n
the formula for which is:192
or, written another way:
- wtx1 +W 1X 2 +-+wnxn
W, + Wz + -- + Win
Note further that if the same weights or multipliers are also applied
to the remainder percentages for x, y, z. . .n, as in [w(l - x)], thus
giving a weighted average of the remainder percentages, both
weighted averages will always equal one-indicating that even if a
weighted average is taken, all the harm will still be accounted for.
Averaging, therefore, seems to be one way to integrate competing
theories of apportionment that will account for all the harm. But are
there other methods that would also do so? Is multiplication always
wrong? It is important to recognize that whatever method a
defendant may attempt to use must be fact-specific and tailored to the
exigencies of a particular case. There may, for example, be
circumstances in which multiplication of certain independent
variables related in space and time are appropriate as a means of
apportionment, provided that the facts establish reasonable
proportionality of such variables to the harm. In such cases,
multiplication may provide an alternative means of apportioning
harm, as long as it accounts for all the harm.
What does it mean to say that multiplication must be
"appropriate?" It means that the factors or variables to be multiplied
must be both (1) independent of one another and (2) proportional to
the harm. For example, where a theory of apportionment is based on
192. See Weighted Mean, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weighted
_mean (last visited September 19, 2010).
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area and time alone, the two factors, area, a, and time, t, may exist in
such a relationship. In such circumstances, a rule of thumb for
determining whether or not multiplication is appropriate as a tool for
apportionment is to find out whether the two variables-area, a, and
time, t-are independent of one another (that is, changing one will
have no effect on the other), and whether the harm or liability, L, is
directly proportional to each of a and t and, by logical extension,
their product. In that event, the relationship between the two
independent variables, which could be described as L = at, liability
(or harm) equals area by time, is written as:
L = k(at)
where, if a and t are proportional to the harm, then k is a constant
ofproportionality.19 3 Where such a relationship exists between a and
t, their multiplication may be appropriate for apportionment purposes.
However, without such a constant, that is, without direct
proportionality of each of a and t to the harm, no reasonable
apportionment can be made by multiplying area by time. Put another
way, without uniformity of the harm across space and time, their
measurement would have no bearing upon a party's responsibility for
site contamination. Furthermore, it should be stressed that both
variables must be independent of one another: no interdependent
relationship can exist between them. This would be the case, for
example, if area was not multiplied by time, but by a waste disposal
percentage which might be expected to vary according to the extent
of the area used for disposal. In that case, the waste disposal variable
193. The term "constant of proportionality" or "proportionality constant" can be
defined mathematically as follows. Given two independent variables x and y, y is
said to be directly proportional to x, that is, the ratio of y to x is always the same, if
there is a non-zero constant k such that k = y : x, or k = ylx, which can also be
written y = k(x). In that case, k is called the constant of proportionality. Given
three independent variables, x, y and z, y may be said to be directly proportional to
the product of x and z, that is, the ratio of y to (xz) is always the same, if k = y :
(xz), or k = y/(xz), which can also be written y = k(xz). That y is also directly
proportional to each of x and z can be demonstrated by holding either x or z
constant. For example, if x is a constant, k(x) in the formula above can be written
as a single constant, kx, and y = k(xz) becomes y = kx(z) , showing y is proportional
to z. Note, however, that for this to hold true, x and z must be independent
variables. See Proportionality, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Proportionality_(mathematics) (last visited September 19, 2010).
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would not be independent of the area or time variables, as they are
with respect to each other, but would be dependent upon each of
them. Finally, it should be recognized that the logic of multiplying
area by time only applies to site "owner/operators." It would appear
to have little or no relevance to "generator/transporter" liability in
most CERCLA cases. Thus, the factual circumstances under which
such multiplication can be used are limited.
It might be objected that uniformity of harm across space and time
are not relevant to "owner" liability under CERCLA § 107(a)(1),
which premises strict liability upon ownership or operation alone.194
Thus, the argument would go, multiplying time by area would
provide an adequate measure of an "owner" defendant's divisible
liability regardless of the distribution of contamination across the site
or over time. This argument overlooks the difficultly of apportioning
harm among all defendants in the event that "transporter/generator"
defendants also exist. But its reasoning is further strained because it
also overlooks the purpose of apportionment, which is to reasonably
divide the harm.
Since the harm does not necessarily respect title boundaries,
ownership alone, though conferring liability, has been consistently
held insufficient as a means of apportionment.19 5 In rejecting a
geographical divisibility argument, the district court for the Western
District of Michigan cited the Seventh Circuit's opinion in United
States v. Capital Tax Corporation for the principle that the following
factors tend to preclude a finding of geographic divisibility: (1) where
the facility functioned as a "dynamic, unitary operation" in which
materials were moved from location to location during the production
process; (2) where there was "migratory potential" and "actual
migration" of the toxic substances; and (3) where there was
commingling and cross-contamination. 196 All of these conditions
194. 14 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2010) ("[njotwithstanding any other provision or rule
of law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section . .
. the owner and operator of a . . . facility . . . shall be liable for . .. . all costs of
removal or remedial action . . . not inconsistent with the national contingency
plan.").
. 195. See, e.g., ITT Corp. v. Borgwarner, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d 848 (W.D. Mich.
2010).
196. Id. at 878 (citing United States v. Capital Tax Corp., 545 F.3d 525, 535-6
(7th Cir. 2008)).
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were supported by the record with respect to the Arvin site.197 The
Seventh Circuit rejected a geographic divisibility claim based on
ownership of a discrete parcel in Capital Tax, stating that "the EPA
has broad discretion in defining the boundaries of a particular facility,
and the boundaries are normally based on the extent of the
contamination. The boundaries of the facility do not necessarily
reflect property boundaries . . and liability can extend beyond what
the defendants actually own."' 9 8
However, although an "owner/operator" defendant may be held
liable for contamination that extends beyond the parcel owned or
operated, divisible liability based on the percentage of ownership or
operation of a site arguably may not be further divided as a matter of
law.199 Finding an owner or operator liable for less than a percentage
of overall site liability premised on its ownership or lease interest,
because, for example, its past ownership was only a portion of the
period of overall site operation, could be said to conflict with
CERCLA's purpose in holding current site "owner/operators" strictly
liable.200  Also, as a matter of public policy, dividing a site
owner/operator's liability geographically could be seen as relieving
site owners or operators of responsibility for mitigating
contamination on their own property which they might argue did not
197. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870,
1875-76 (2009).
198. 545 F.3d 525, 535 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Rohm & Haas
Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1280-81 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding responsible party jointly and
severally liable although owned only 10% of site)).
199. See United States v. Newmont USA Limited, No. CV-05-020-JLQ, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82922 at *157-8 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 17, 2008) (Newmont's
divisibility claim based on its limited "footprint" of operations at the "Midnite
Mine" in the early "exploration" period of operation was rejected. Notwithstanding
its claim that its historic mining operations were limited in scope geographically,
the court found Newmont strictly liable as an "operator" of the entire site under a
Bestfoods analysis, at 136-150).
200. See Gelber, supra note 47, at 6 ("Subject to the limited defenses in Section
107(b) and the liability exclusion in Section 107(r), CERCLA makes current
owners strictly liable even if they have had no connection to the contamination-
causing activities. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (2010) A divisibility defense for
current owners arguably nullifies the additional proof requirements imposed by
Section 107(b)(3), such as due care and reasonable precautions, and the conditions
in Section 101(40)." Section 101(40) sets forth requirements for establishing "bona
fide prospective purchaser" status to qualify for the liability exclusion of Section
107(r) of CERCLA).
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originate with their operations. The Sixth Circuit addressed a
geographic divisibility defense raised by Brighton Township in
United States v. Township ofBrighton and noted:
[a]llowing Brighton Township to assert a geographical
basis for apportionment would completely undermine our
earlier analysis that Brighton Township was an operator of
the entire facility. Moreover, allowing a geographically
based divisibility defense would seriously weaken
CERCLA's remedial scheme. An operator who can escape
liability when its operational activities were limited to a
discrete portion of the facility has no incentive to engage in
the voluntary cleanup of the contamination caused by
hazardous waste disposed of on the remaining portion of
the facility.20
The Ninth Circuit in Burlington Northern similarly criticized the
lower court's "meat-axe" approach "premised on percentages of land
ownership," because "[s]uch an approach would be tantamount to a
disagreement with the imposition of no-fault land ownership
liability."202 Therefore, even where factors such as area and time can
be multiplied, for an "owner" or "operator" defendant, such
multiplication may conflict with CERCLA's purpose in holding such
defendants strictly liable.
2. Burlington Northern
If we now apply these concepts to the facts in Burlington Northern,
we may be able to suggest what the Supreme Court might have done
to resolve conflicting theories of apportionment based variously on
(a) time of ownership/operation (b) area controlled and (c) waste
disposal, assuming adequate factual development to support such a
multi-factor approach. First, the Burlington Northern district court
might have simply averaged the three percentages, assuming each
factor or theory of divisibility is considered to have equal weight.
Had a straight average of the three factors been taken, the result
201. U.S. v. Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 331 (6th Cir. 1998) (Moore, J., concurring
separately).
202. United States v. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 502 F.3d 781,
803 (9th Cir. 2007).
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would have been 43.6% for the Railroads and 56.4% for B&B and
Shell. Furthermore, had any one of the three factors been considered
more important than the others, or had their importance been ranked
in some way, a weighted average could have been taken. Either
approach would have accounted for all the harm, ensuring that no
unapportioned share resulted.
However, based on the above discussion, it should be apparent that
the Burlington Northern district court's multiplication of at least
those two factors related in space and time might have been
appropriate, provided both were proportional to the harm. In that
case, the court might have been correct in ascribing 9%, the
approximate product of time by area, to the Railroads based on their
"owner" liability, and that calculation could have accounted for all
the harm. The reason is that, with respect to both time and area,
while the Railroads are liable for 19% of the area only 45% of the
time, B&B is assumed to be responsible for 100% of the area all the
time (these two factors are inapplicable to Shell). While the site area
is divided between the two owner-operators 19% to 81%, that only
holds true for the 45% of the time of the Railroads' operations. The
balance of the time, 55%, the Railroads would have had zero liability
while B&B would have had 100%, as illustrated in Table 2. The
result is that while the Railroads would have been liable for
approximately 9%, B&B (as the only other viable PRP) would have
been liable for 91%, thus accounting for 100% of the harm.
Such a result appears statistically sound; however, aside from the
initial difficulties that it falls outside the range of the two factors
taken together and compromises "owner" strict liability, it has -two
other major flaws: (1) it necessarily assumes proportionality to the
harm, that is, both qualitative and quantitative uniformity of the
contamination across space and time-which was not supported by
the facts at the Arvin site; and (2) it completely ignores the district
court's findings regarding site-wide operations by B&B,
commingling and migration of hazardous substances at the Site, and
the potential for groundwater infiltration from both parcels.
Significantly, it ignores substantial evidence in the record of the
responsibility of both site owner/operators for site-wide
contamination, particularly B&B.
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Table 2
BURLINGTON NORTHERN SPACE-TIME THEORY
FACTOR Railroads B & B
AREA 19% 81%
TIME 1 45% x 19% 45% x 81%
TIME 2 55% x 0% 55% x 100%
TOTAL 9% (8.55%) 91% (91.45%)
In effect, the district court's approach in Burlington Northern could
be viewed as an attempt to meld two theories of divisibility: one
based on area and time and the other based on waste disposal alone.
The logic of the first is that if one defendant owns a % of a site for t
% of the time, then the product, at, is one way to determine its
divisible liability. This would make sense if the only defendants
were the two owner/operators, the contamination were distributed
evenly over the entire site, and disposal practices of both defendants
were proportional to the area controlled by each and constant for their
respective periods of ownership or operation. In other words, the
proportional constant, k, would need to be part of the formula: both
factors would have had to be directly proportional to the harm.
However, in its opinion, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the
record did not indicate this was the case at the Arvin site.203 The
Ninth Circuit stressed that the "land area" theory of apportionment
was problematic since "the mere percentage of land owned by one
PRP relative to the entire facility cannot alone be a basis for
203. Id. at 802-04.
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apportionment, as it does not provide a minimally reliable basis for
tracing the proportion of leakage, contamination, or cleanup costs
associated with the entire parcel."204 The Ninth Circuit further stated
that, "[n]othing in the record supports a conclusion that the leakage of
contaminants that ended up on the B&B parcel occurred on each
parcel in proportion to its size."205 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit also
criticized the second theory based on time period of ownership,
because the "simple fraction based on the time that the Railroads
owned the land. . .assumes constant leakage on the facility as a whole
or constant contamination traceable to the facility as a wholefor each
time period [and] no evidence suggests that to be the case." 206 The
Ninth Circuit further noted that excluding the Railroads' liability for
the period of time preceding B&B's lease was inappropriate given the
"evidentiary vacuum concerning the amount of contamination
traceable to the pre-lease period." 207  Where uniformity of the
contamination across space and time is not present, multiplication of
space-time factors makes no sense. This exercise would be like
attempting to determine the two-dimensional area of a room by
measuring its length and width with a tape measure containing kinks
and knots, or over obstacles such as chairs and desks requiring
vertical as well as horizontal measurement.
As demonstrated in Table 2, if the Burlington Northern district
court had only considered two factors, area and time, the Railroads
might have been found liable for 9% on that basis, assuming
proportionality to the harm. In fact, the Supreme Court cited the
multiplication of time by area as one way of justifying the district
court's conclusion that the Railroads' liability was 9%.208 But even
had that been appropriate, it would have completely ignored the
district court's findings regarding the integration of operations at the
Site, migration of contaminants, and the responsibility of both owner-
operators for site-wide contamination of both soil and
204. Id. at 802 (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 803 (emphasis added).
206 Id. at 803-04 (emphasis added).
207. Id. at 804.
208. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870,
1883 (2009).
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groundwater. 2 09 As shown above, there is ample evidence in the
record and in the district court's findings that the liability of the
Railroads was not limited to their own parcel, but included
responsibility for migratory site-wide contamination.2 10 Besides their
liability as "owners," "operator" liability for direct disposal could
also have been imputed to the Railroads themselves by knowledge of
spills and/or failure to mitigate the harm: both were found by the
district court. 2 11 Therefore, limiting the Railroads' liability to a
function of area and time would have completely ignored the district
court's extensive findings regarding site-wide disposal.2 12
In any event, multiplying area by time alone was not the court's
method: the district court reached the conclusion that the Railroads'
share was 6% (before application of the 150% multiplier), because it
further multiplied that 9% by a third factor, 66.6%, the percentage of
waste disposal attributed to the Railroads.213 If that factor had been
intended as the Railroads' contribution to site-wide contamination,
such multiplication was erroneous despite the use of the court's
corrective 150% multiplier, because by doing so the court failed to
account for 100% of the harm. That is because had B&B been
viable, its share would have been 91% as indicated in Table 2. But
that 91% would further have been reduced by multiplying it by
33.3% to factor in the site-wide waste disposal factor (assuming Shell
was not liable), giving about 30% to B&B and accounting for only
36% of the total harm.214
209. See U.S. v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. CV-F-92-5068,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23130 at *12-61 ( 15-152), *72 (T 187), *250-61 (TT 472-
89), *268-71 (TT 501-505), (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2003).
210. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *251-58 (
472-487).
211. Id. at *268-69 ( j 501-505).
212. See infra n. 215.
213. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *258-61 (
488-9).
214. Note that the district court originally apportioned 6% to Shell, as a
generator, based on waste disposal alone. Id. at *271-72. This means any space-
time analysis relied on by the court to determine the Railroads' liability would have
had no relevance whatsoever to Shell's liability, which was based exclusively on
waste disposal, not area or time, thus further calling the space-time theory into
question. Furthermore, the district court calculated Shell's 6% based on the
percentage of total D-D spills attributable to Shell, not Shell's percentage of total
releases of all chemicals at the Site. See id. at *267, 498, which reads in its
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On the other hand, had the district court intended its two-thirds
multiplier to apply only to the Railroad parcel, multiplication of that
factor times the area-time product might be rationalized based on an
argument that the other third of contamination requiring remediation
found on or in groundwater below that parcel, presumably
attributable to D-D, was caused not by releases on the Railroad parcel
but by migratory releases from the B&B parcel. In this view, the
Supreme Court's statement that the two chemicals, Nemagon and
dinoseb, "contributed to 2/3 of overall site contamination" only
means that two-thirds of the entire Site was contaminated with
Nemagon and dinoseb (the other third by D-D) and that, although all
three chemicals were found on both parcels, only spills of Nemagon
and dinoseb in quantities sufficient to require remediation occurred
on the Railroad parcel.215 This would mean that the district court
might have concluded that the Railroads were only liable for two-
thirds of the contamination on their parcel, while B&B was liable for
100% of the contamination on its own parcel as well as the remaining
entirety as follows: "The percentage of D-D spills resulting from Shell deliveries is
calculated by dividing 1,863 gallons (the D-D spilled through Shell controlled
deliveries) by 31,212 gallons (the total amount of D-D spills) to equal
approximately 6%."
215. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870,
1883 (2009) ("[t]he fact that no D-D spills on the Railroad parcel required
remediation lends strength to the district court's conclusion that the Railroad parcel
contributed only Nemagon and dinoseb in quantities requiring remediation")
However, since the district court found the Site was graded so that surface runoff
"drained to the waste pond on the southeast corner of the B&B parcel," that is,
away from the Railroad parcel. See Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS at *255, 479. Further, there was testimony that a pipe under the
railroad spur tracks "allowed the water on the Railroad parcel to drain to the pond."
There was also testimony that the purpose of the pond "prior to 1980 was...to
collect rainwater from the entire plant." Id. at *22-3, 1 52-3 (emphasis added). The
lease term of the Railroad parcel began in 1975. Id. at *5-6. It appears likely that
the district court simply concluded based on conflicting expert testimony that,
although D-D spills occurred on the Railroad parcel, they did not contribute
significantly to the incurrence of response costs compared to releases of D-D on the
B&B parcel, which were more likely to have affected the groundwater. See id. at
*22-37 ( 52-85). However, releases of D-D on the Railroad parcel, had they
migrated to the B&B pond through surface run-off, could have entered the
groundwater from that location. ("It is undisputed that the pond, the sump, and the
dinoseb spill area, all of which are located on the B&B parcel, were and are the
primary sources of the groundwater contamination at the Site.") Id. at *35, 1 81.
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one-third of the contamination on the Railroad parcel. That would
give B&B, in addition to 100% of the contamination on its 91% of
the area/time continuum (see Table 2), one-third of the Railroads'
9%, or 3%, for a total of 94%; while the Railroads' liability would be
two-thirds of its 9% of area/time, or 6%. These two percentages add
up to 100% and appear to have the virtue of accounting for all the
harm.
The problem with this calculation, however, besides the reality that
it is purely speculative and cannot be found per se in the district
court's opinion, is that it has no basis in fact: it would ignore the
district court's finding that releases of all three chemicals regularly
occurred on both parcels, the entire site was one continuous "sloppy"
B&B operation, and there was evidence of migration of contaminants
216from the Railroad parcel to a pond and sump on the B&B parcel.
Both the pond and sump, in addition to contributing to soil
contamination on that parcel, were found to be two of three primary
sources of groundwater infiltration from surface contamination at the
Site. 217  To limit the Railroads' liability to two-thirds of the
contamination on their own property would disregard evidence of
site-wide operations by B&B and site-wide migration of those
contaminants.
216. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *72 (§ Y, 1
187), and *250-58 ( f 472-87).
217. Id. Spills of all three chemicals, D-D, dinoseb and Nemagon, regularly
occurred on the Railroad parcel. As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, "[a]ll three
chemicals were on the Railroad parcel at some time." United States v. Burlington
Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 502 F.3d 781, 804 (9th Cir. 2007). However, the
district court discounted the government's expert testimony that surface spills on
the Railroad parcel reached the groundwater through flaws or cracks in the soil
surface, which had been contested by the Railroads' experts. Balancing these
competing views, the court concluded that: "The Government's evidence does not
establish by a preponderance that the chemical releases contaminated the
groundwater under the Railroad parcel through focused infiltration." Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *255, 479 (emphasis added).
However, the court did find that "[d]inoseb and DCP (a major D-D constituent)
were transported to the groundwater by water... [and] there was sufficient water at
the Site to dissolve organic liquid spills." Id. at *27-8, 66. The court also found
that "it is plausible some surface spills of chemicals on the Railroad parcel reached
the waste pond by down-gradient surface water flow." Id. at *255, 479. The pond
was a primary source of groundwater infiltration. Id. at *35, T 81.
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Furthermore, the district court found that: "[tjhe evidence
establishes by more than a preponderance that throughout its
operations, B&B personnel spilled chemicals, allowed chemical
leakage, and rinsed down equipment, causing hazardous agricultural
chemicals to be released to the environment, which directly caused
the present need for CERCLA remediation." 218 B&B's "operations"
included the Railroad parcel. 2 19 Therefore, B&B is not liable just as
an "owner," but as "operator" of the entire Site: its liability for site-
wide waste disposal would not have been limited to its own parcel but
must be presumed to be 100% of the entire Site. Since B&B's
percentage of both time and area as an "operator" of the entire site
would also be 100%, further assigning 100% to B&B for site-wide
waste disposal would leave B&B with 100% of the liability, a result
in conflict with the Restatement's prohibition against apportionment
of a single harm where any one defendant is 100% liable for all of
it.220
Moreover, the third factor, the waste disposal percentage, is
dependent on each of the two space-time factors: it can be expected
to vary according to both area of disposal and time period of disposal.
Therefore, it is not an independent variable appropriate for
multiplication; it is really an entirely separate theory of divisibility.
The whole purpose of multiplying area by time is to divide the harm:
to determine how much of the contamination each defendant is
responsible for. If on the other hand, waste-disposal evidence were
available which provided a more accurate and proportional measure
of the harm, there would be no purpose to the space-time calculation
and the waste evidence would speak for itself.
In effect, the district court in Burlington Northern was really
grappling with one theory based on space-time parameters and an
alternative theory based on waste disposal evidence alone.221 Given
218. Id. at *72, 187 (emphasis added).
219. Id. at *8-10, 1-7.
220. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 433A(2) cmt. i (1965) (harms which
are normally incapable of any logical, reasonable , or practical division include
where either cause would have been sufficient in itself to bring about the result)
(emphasis added).
221. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at
*260, 489 (court alternatively finds that "the Railroad parcel could not have
contributed to more than 10% of the volume or mass of the overall site
contamination . . . ." In other words, the court is using a strictly volumetric theory
[VOL. XXII
ALL IS NUMBER
that the space-time theory requires constants which were not found at
the Arvin Site (even distribution of similar waste across the site,
uniform disposal of that waste over time), the better theory, if it could
be proved, would have been to simply rely on the waste disposal
evidence itself,. as long as it could be shown it represented a
proportional division of the harm. It seems unlikely, however, that in
the vast majority of CERCLA cases, the Burlington Northern district
court's sua sponte rough estimate of waste contribution would pass
muster for that purpose, since in most cases the parties would have an
opportunity to develop the record and advance their arguments
concerning the issue of divisibility apportionment-an opportunity
which was denied the parties in Burlington Northern.22 2
IV. CONCLUSION
What does the future hold for defendants attempting to establish
divisibility of a single harm under Burlington Northern? In its
Burlington Northern opinion, the Supreme Court did not state it was
changing the law but rather only affirmed the existing standard for
divisibility based on longstanding case law and the Second
Restatement of Torts, Sec. 433A. That standard places the burden on
a defendant raising the defense, who must still prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the prerequisites for theoretical
apportionment of a single harm are met: that is, at a minimum, that
both the harm and its causes are sufficiently proportional to one
another, and all the harm is attributable to some cause. At most
Superfund sites, simply meeting these threshold criteria will remain
difficult due to the commingling of multiple site contaminants with
varying toxicity, migratory potential, and synergistic capacities, as
well as the possible incompleteness or unreliability of disposal
evidence.
The only unusual feature of the opinion regarding divisibility is the
Supreme Court's holding that the record supported the district court's
of apportionment, which gives 10% to the Railroads, to support its area-time
theory, which (whether adjusted for waste percentage and uncertainty or not) would
have given 9% of site liability to the Railroads.
222. See Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct.
1870, 1883 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("I would return these cases to the
[d]istrict [c]ourt to give all parties a fair opportunity to address that court's
endeavor to allocate costs").
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method of apportionment, an approach based on resolving the
differences among multiple factors, each of which can be viewed as a
separate theory of divisibility, through multiplication alone. That
method is so foreign to the existing standard of divisibility as
articulated by the federal courts, which appear to require an election
of such theories as opposed to their integration, as to render its
possible future application extremely limited. One could, for
example, imagine a factual scenario in which more than one theory of
apportionment of a single harm gave close results, requiring only
minor adjustments in resolving their differences. Similarly, a space-
time theory, i.e., area owned, which by itself is inadequate to
apportion liability, may bear a multiplicative relationship to another
space-time theory, such as time of operation, which by itself is
equally inadequate; but where multiplication of the two, assuming
proportionality of both to the harm, would achieve a satisfactory
result. However, in most cases multiple theories of divisibility are
more likely to give incompatible and divergent results because they
may entail incompatible measures, different classes of defendants,
and different kinds of harm. In such cases, relying on competing
multiple theories may make it impossible for a defendant to make
even a threshold theoretical divisibility showing consistent with the
principles of Chem-Dyne and the Restatement.
Furthermore, should a district court find itself with the need to
resolve competing theories of divisibility in a future CERCLA case,
unless the factors the court uses are independent, related in space and
time and proportional to the harm, it cannot use the Burlington
Northern district court's method without straying from the principles
of the Restatement and the Chem-Dyne dynasty of federal case law
affirmed by the Supreme Court in its opinion. That is because
multiplication of dependent factors can leave the plaintiff with an
unapportioned share, an inherent contradiction since apportionment
must account for all sources contributing to a single harm. While in
most future cases attempting to establish that a divisible harm is
capable of apportionment should not entail more than one theory of
divisibility, if it becomes necessary to resolve the results of
competing theories in an appropriate case, a method should be found
that is tailored to the facts and mathematically sound. In that regard,
the district court's Burlington Northern methodology should be
regarded as more cautionary tale than prescription.
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